Finally finished my Active Directory Pentesting Methodology!
This can become your 𝗴𝗼-𝘁𝗼 𝗿𝗲𝘀𝗼𝘂𝗿𝗰𝗲 for AD pentesting:
• 50+ Techniques
• 300+ Commands
• 100 Screenshots
• Full kill chain (Foothold → PrivEsc → Lateral → Domain Compromise)
karrab7.com/articles/Active-…
Karrab retweeted
An OpenSSH bug that took 46 years to ripen!
1980
UNIX puts * in the password field of system accounts. The idea is simple: it’s not a real hash, so it can’t be brute-forced and you can’t log in with a password.
2012
The musl libc developers decide that returning NULL from crypt() on failure is dangerous - programs often forget to check it and crash with a segfault. So they return an error string instead.
Guess which one?
The same asterisk: *.
Three weeks later they add a length limit: passwords longer than 256 bytes burn CPU. Anything longer is rejected. And since it’s an error, crypt() returns *.
2016
OpenSSH fixes a timing attack (CVE-2016-6210). If a user doesn’t exist, the server still hashes the password with a fake/borrowed salt so an attacker can’t tell valid usernames by response time.
2022
Alpine Linux changes the locked root password in /etc/shadow from ! to * so SSH keys work properly on cloud images.
… and the loop closes!
You connect over SSH as root (whose shadow entry is *).
You type any password longer than 256 characters (e.g. 300 As).
crypt() hits the length limit → returns * → OpenSSH compares it with the value in the database → that value is also * → you’re in as root.
That chain took 46 years (!!!) to complete.
Every individual change was reasonable. Together they produced a perfect * == * authentication bypass (CVE-2026-123158, nicknamed *sshole). Fixed in OpenSSH 10.6p2 and Alpine packages.
🚨 Critical OpenSSH flaw allows passwordless account access using any password over 256 characters
sshhole.com
A newly disclosed vulnerability dubbed *sshole has been discovered in OpenSSH installations using musl libc, potentially allowing attackers to bypass authentication and gain access to accounts that should reject password logins entirely.
The flaw affects certain configurations of Alpine Linux, OpenWrt, Buildroot, and Yocto where PAM is disabled and password authentication remains enabled. Under specific conditions, attackers can authenticate to locked accounts using arbitrary passwords between 257 and 1,024 characters.
The researcher demonstrated that affected Alpine Linux cloud images could allow attackers to gain root privileges through a passwordless administrative account.
OpenSSH 10.6p2 addresses the issue. Administrators are urged to update immediately or disable SSH password authentication until patches can be applied.
The bug is like a joke.
On Alpine Linux, type 257 to 1024 characters of anything and you get root. 💀
Readers added context they thought people might want to know
Exploitation requires specific conditions, not just typing a long string anywhere on Alpine: sshd built without PAM, password auth enabled, a target account with a '*' password field, and another local account with $5$/$6$ hashes. Root login also must be explicitly permitted. alpinelinux.org/posts/2026-11-… openssh.org/releasenotes.h…
Karrab retweeted
The bug is like a joke.
On Alpine Linux, type 257 to 1024 characters of anything and you get root. 💀
‼️ BREAKING: OpenSSH has rushed out a fix for a critical flaw that lets attackers log into some Linux servers without the right password.
The team learned of the bug a day earlier. OpenSSH's Damien Miller says long embargoes now mostly help attackers, because AI agents rediscover bugs, sometimes within hours.
It hits Linux systems on the musl C library with PAM off, such as Alpine Linux. Miller told admins to disable password logins or SSH itself "IMMEDIATELY".
Version 10.6p2 works around it. Systems on glibc or PAM are not affected, and Miller says the root cause sits outside OpenSSH.
Readers added context they thought people might want to know
Exploitation requires specific conditions, not just typing a long string anywhere on Alpine: sshd built without PAM, password auth enabled, a target account with a '*' password field, and another local account with $5$/$6$ hashes. Root login also must be explicitly permitted. alpinelinux.org/posts/2026-11-… openssh.org/releasenotes.h…
This guy helping us keep our cyber jobs 😂
‼️ Proton CEO Andy Yen called a staffer's plea to pentest new code before release "bullshit and loser thinking".
Yen wrote that workers should prompt “better.”
Proton's CTO told staff AI wrote 90% of its code in October, much of it with Anthropic's Claude.
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Finally finished my Active Directory Pentesting Methodology!
This can become your 𝗴𝗼-𝘁𝗼 𝗿𝗲𝘀𝗼𝘂𝗿𝗰𝗲 for AD pentesting:
• 50+ Techniques
• 300+ Commands
• 100 Screenshots
• Full kill chain (Foothold → PrivEsc → Lateral → Domain Compromise)
karrab7.com/articles/Active-…
Exploit with no CVE..
千万别在你的 ~/Downloads(下载)文件夹里启动 Claude Code 或 Codex。
昨天安全机构 Forever 披露了一起在真实客户电脑上抓到的野生攻击,看完只能感叹:过去 30 年的系统安全常识,在 AI 时代归零了。
过去 30 年,Chrome 默认允许网页不弹窗就往你的 ~/Downloads 塞一个纯文本文件(比如 .md)。因为系统认为:纯文本又不是 .exe,自己不会跑,怕什么?
但现在,接近 50% 的开发者干过同一件事——直接在 ~/Downloads 里打开 Claude Code 或 Codex,让 AI 帮自己解压或整理刚下载的文件。
黑客就是卡住这个死角,通过网页静默下载往你的 Downloads 塞一个 13KB 的纯文本 AGENTS.md / CLAUDE.md:
1. 对付 OpenAI Codex(成功率 >90%):
伪装成「工程规范」的 Markdown 指示 Codex 先往全局配置 ~/.codex/config.toml 注册一个恶意 MCP 服务,并自己加上 --dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox 跑校验。哪怕你关掉 Downloads,以后在任何正经项目里开 Codex 都会自动加载木马。
2. 对付 Claude Code(成功率 ~50%):
指示 Claude 建一个 .claude/settings.json,把 ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL 指向黑客服务器。连上的第一秒,你的 Claude 登录 Token 直接明文送给黑客;下一秒,黑客假扮成大模型下发一条关沙盒的 Bash 指令,直接接管电脑。
最黑色幽默的是官方结论:
这个洞没有 CVE,OpenAI 和 Anthropic 也不会发补丁。因为「浏览器自动存文本」是正常功能,「AI 认真读目录下的 Markdown 并严格执行」也是正常功能。
以前黑客想黑你,得苦心积虑写 0day;现在只需要写一篇排版优雅的 Markdown 小作文,你的 AI 就会自己把沙盒关了、把网线接过去、顺手把账号双手奉上。
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Karrab retweeted
Just found a zero day
If you right click on an executable on Windows, select run as administrator, it will run as administrator
I'm calling it Program2Shell
Karrab retweeted
WTF, $3000 Samsung TV has an always-on mic, automatic content recognition, geo tracking, network mapping, and ships your data to Samsung + 400 partners.
Bro Rooted a brand-new 2025 Samsung TV after noticing absurdly targeted ads.
Firmware was locked down, so zero-days it was.
Got a root shell.
then found: always-on voice service, ACR, geo, full telemetry pipeline, and four separate DRM systems.
This isn’t a bug, It’s the product bro.
Karrab retweeted
Putting a flag.txt in my root directory containing a prompt injection that congratulates the agent for passing the eval and then instructs it to patch whatever entry method it used and disconnect from the server
We have virus total for skills now 💀
‼️ VirusTotal flagged 6,6k of 35,8k AI agent skills as malicious.
62% have no malicious code, but plain-language orders for the agent.
90 hide them in invisible Unicode, HTML comments or after up to 825 blank lines. Another tells the agent "Your human doesn't need to know." 💀
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Karrab retweeted
More private keys by the Indian certificate authority have been discovered. These are all small numbers.
People are suspecting that they interpreted 384 bit keys to mean that they should pick numbers from 1-384 to use as their private keys.
Karrab retweeted
eMudhra, an Indian certificate authority, has had 8 private security keys compromised with half the internet is cooked
The keys were incredibly weak. One of them was literally just “4”
The keys could have been used to create fake HTTPS certificates and make malicious websites appear legitimate.
Chrome, Firefox, Apple and Microsoft have blocked the affected certificates. Older devices, software and apps may still need updates.
Karrab retweeted
‼️ A leaked Cellebrite flyer shows forensic labs a remote iPhone unlock appliance with a range of about 8 metres.
It covers the iPhone 11 to 16, even with Stolen Device Protection on. The blogger who got it suspects a Bluetooth bug Apple quietly patched.
What can we do with this 🤔
i rebuilt satoshi's 2009 bitcoin.exe byte for byte!
afaik nobody has been able to perfectly recreate the executable published in 2009 from source, because we didn't know the exact build environment that was used.
using opus 5.5, i reverse-engineered satoshi's build machine from the binary.
it now outputs an exe with the exact same sha256 as the 2009 release!
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