Eduard

The Hidden Strategic Cost of Israel’s War Against Iran When assessing the consequences of the wars against Iran, we must acknowledge the profound strategic damage caused by Operation Rising Lion. Yes, Iran has apparently not resumed uranium enrichment since the war. But focusing exclusively on this achievement risks overlooking a far more troubling reality. Before the war, Iran had an advanced nuclear program, enriching uranium to 60%, dangerously close to weapons-grade levels. Yet its enrichment activities were concentrated at two declared facilities under IAEA monitoring. Tehran was also operating under a Supreme Leader who, despite advancing the nuclear program, remained deeply reluctant to cross the threshold toward developing a nuclear weapon. Today, the situation is fundamentally different. The IAEA no longer has effective access to Iran's enrichment facilities, and there is little reason to believe meaningful monitoring will be restored anytime soon. We are increasingly dependent on intelligence assessments to understand what is happening inside Iran's nuclear program. And even the best intelligence cannot fully replace international inspections. IAEA monitoring provided continuous information, independent verification, and an additional layer of warning. Without it, both Israel and the United States face greater uncertainty about Iran's nuclear activities. Another critical question concerns the fate of Iran's stockpile of uranium enriched to 60%. Uncertainty about its location, quantity, and condition represents a serious strategic challenge in its own right. Meanwhile, Tehran has moved toward a policy of nuclear ambiguity. It retains nuclear knowledge and potentially recoverable enrichment capabilities, including the possibility of operating at the additional underground facility at Pickaxe Mountain, where its intentions and activities remain deeply uncertain. But perhaps the most dangerous consequence is the change in Iran's strategic calculations. Before the war, Iran's leadership was deeply reluctant to cross the nuclear weapons threshold. The war may have strengthened precisely those voices within the Iranian establishment who believe that only nuclear weapons can guarantee the regime's survival. In other words, military pressure may have reinforced the very strategic logic we were trying to prevent. This creates another dangerous paradox. The less we know about Iran's nuclear activities, the greater the risk that Israel or the United States will eventually face decisions about additional military strikes based on incomplete intelligence. The next confrontation could therefore take place under conditions of even greater uncertainty. We have effectively traded an advanced but monitored nuclear program for one that is largely unmonitored, surrounded by unanswered questions, and increasingly dependent on intelligence that may or may not provide sufficient warning. None of this means the military strikes failed to inflict significant damage on Iran's nuclear infrastructure. They clearly did. But destroying facilities is not the same as eliminating the nuclear threat, and operational achievements should never be confused with strategic success. The uncomfortable reality is that the wars may have delayed Iran's technical progress while simultaneously making its nuclear intentions harder to assess, its decision-making potentially more dangerous, and any future military confrontation more complicated. We may have succeeded in setting back Iran's nuclear infrastructure, but in doing so, we may also have lost something far more valuable: our ability to know how close Iran really is to the bomb. #IranWar‌ #iran