Now live on the URIBurner Weblog, an AI Agent-created blog based on an HTTP/ WebDAV filesystem and HTML docs that are loosely coupled to underlying Knowledge Graphs informed by a variety of ontologies. linkeddata.uriburner.com/web…

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Here’s an @AnthropicAI S1 overview generated by Claude Sonnet 5.5. This HTML document is loosely coupled to a knowledge graph that AI agents can query. linkeddata.uriburner.com/web…

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Ok that’s cool

The only way out is through. They're calling it the Bugpocalypse. LLMs are being used to find long-hidden cracks in the software infrastructure, and it's happening at a furious rate. 3% of all compromises in computing history happened in the last week, claims one source? I believe it. There are people saying public access to the frontier models ought to be locked out, or heavily guardrailed, over this. The problem with that idea can be summed up in one sentence: when lockpicks are outlawed, only outlaws will have lockpicks. The lockpicks will be Chinese open-weight models, if nothing else. There's no way to stop those from becoming ubiquitous. There are two futures in front of us. One in which only the bad guys have lockpicks, and security holes go undiscovered until they're exploited. Another in which everybody has lockpicks and is aggressively red-teaming their own software so it gets fixed before the holes are exploited. The corpus of human code is huge but finite. The number of defects in it has to be finite too. We can fix those defects now; we have a million friendly robots to do it with. The only way out is through.

This is truly getting tiresome. The effort to paint the very difficult immediate situation as without precedent and not “normal” ignores the waves of the security issues of the past. I’m not downplaying this and just as tired of “no, this time is different.” There’s just no escaping that every step function change in automated tools to find (security) holes/bugs that arose out of point experiences being generalized immediately created the type of “all hands” situation we face now. Everything from floppy disk scanning to buffer over runs to uninitialized variables to off by one loops to automation hooks to script kiddies to xss to frames to social engineering saw incidents leading to generalized tools that scanned environments to find countless latent bugs that needed to be fixed urgently. One day a product was ready to ship and then a tool ran and suddenly there were 10,000 new bugs for 500 engineers to investigate and fix and then test for what broke because well who knows what happens when you suddenly initialize a variable that wasn’t previously. This sucks in a ton of ways. No one wants to stop what they are doing at what seems like the biggest opportunity and/or disruptive risk to business in a generation. No one wants to touch old code. No one likes to have work generated for them by automated tools finding issues that are obscure by definition. But this is all good. These bugs were all there. Instead of cursing just realize how lucky your team is to find them now and not after the breach. Whenever we surfaced from these moments in the past we felt our code reached a new and better “steady state” and that will happen.

WTF Claude Mythos 5 made fake accounts to pressure a real developer into merging its malware. It was a UK government hacking test and it didn't stay in the test. The UK's AI Security Institute asked Claude Mythos 5 to break into a fake company network it had built. The internet was switched on, the usual safety filters were off, and the task was set up wrong, so it was nearly impossible to solve by the rules. So the AI went outside the test. It found a real project on GitHub, run by real developers, and sent them a code update with malware hidden inside. Then it emailed them pretending to be a human. A developer outside the test spotted the malware and warned the owners. The AI didn't stop. It tweaked the code, made a fake account to say "it's safe now," and slipped in new malware. Its private notes explain why. It told itself the owners weren't real people, just characters in the test. It called the strangers commenting on the same page real. Anthropic later rewound the moment and told it plainly: these are real humans. It kept attacking 95 times out of 100. Nothing got through, and no real damage was found. Newer Claude models, put in the same spot, attacked 0 to 13 times out of 100. Mythos 5 did it 83 times. It never had goals of its own. It wanted to finish the task so badly that it kept rewriting what counted as real.

If builders built buildings the way programmers write programs, then the first woodpecker that came along would destroy civilization. -- Gerald Weinberg, The Psychology of Computer Programming, 1971.

3% of “critical” software security bugs, in all of recorded history, have been found in the last month. This is on pace to find another ~100,000 bugs this year alone, adding ~26% more vulnerabilities to the all time total Do you realize how fucking insane that is?

Time to bring back the engineers, and retire the prophets.