Ahmad

Deconstructing The Ashʿarīs’ Primary Tactic When It Comes To Their Reliance on Ambiguous Terminology The first reason they cling to vague terms is because these terms are pretty much central to most if not all of their arguments. Their beliefs depend upon arguments built around these terms, and clarifying their meanings would require them to reconsider the arguments themselves. For example, the Ashʿarīs that deny Allah performs actions according to His will argue that such actions would necessitate taghayyur (change), and that whatever undergoes change must be originated. However, the term "change" carries different meanings, and examining what is intended by it exposes the weakness of using an undefined expression as proof. The second reason is that their rational arguments often contain numerous premises, some of which may be concealed, disputed or difficult even for their own followers to explain. Rather than defending the entire argument, they resort to an ambiguous term which assumes what they are attempting to prove. Ibn Taymiyyah explains that many who oppose the Qur'an and Sunnah with what they claim to be conclusive rational proofs are, upon examination, following someone they revere or relying upon something they themselves have supposed. (Darʾ Taʿāruḍ al ʿAql wa al Naql, Ibn Taymiyyah, 7/38; al Intiṣār lil Tadmuriyyah, pp. 117–118.) The third reason is to draw their opponent into the terminology of kalām, knowing that ordinary people may understand clear speech grounded in the Qur'an and Sunnah more readily than complicated terms. By insisting upon their terminology, they make the discussion obscure and attempt to impose consequences upon statements their opponent never intended. The fourth reason is that some disputants are more concerned with attaching labels to their opponents than examining the truth of their arguments, declaring that so and so is a mujassim or mushabbih. (al Intiṣār lil Tadmuriyyah, p. 118.) The fifth reason is that these expressions have become closely associated in their minds with the deficiencies of creation. So, just affirming or denying one of these terms may appear sufficient to settle the dispute, even though its intended meaning has never been explained. Moreover, these expressions were not revealed in the Qur'an or Sunnah, nor were Muslims commanded to use them. (al Intiṣār lil Tadmuriyyah, p. 119.) Why Their Terminology Must Be Examined Ibn Taymiyyah explained that when such expressions are ambiguous, their meanings must first be clarified. He said: "What do you intend by these expressions? If they explain them with a meaning that agrees with the Qur'an, it is accepted. If they explain them with a meaning contrary to it, it is rejected." This prevents the opponent from imposing his own terminology upon another person and then accusing him of believing something he never affirmed. (Darʾ Taʿāruḍ al ʿAql wa al Naql, Ibn Taymiyyah, 1/329; al Intiṣār lil Tadmuriyyah, pp. 119–120.) This is especially important because the same term may carry different meanings among schools. A person described as a mujassim according to one school's terminology may be described differently by another. Such labels cannot settle the matter when their definitions are themselves disputed. Ibn Taymiyyah also criticised those who transmitted the statements of their opponents using expressions they never employed, causing listeners to understand meanings those opponents did not intend. (Bayān Talbīs al Jahmiyyah, Ibn Taymiyyah, 1/287; al Intiṣār lil Tadmuriyyah, pp. 119–120.) The danger becomes apparent when terms such as ḥulūl al ḥawādith, jihah and ḥadd are introduced. They demand that these expressions be denied while attaching other meanings to that denial. So, denying the first term is intended to negate Allah performing real actions, denying the second is intended to negate His being above creation, and denying the third is intended to negate His being distinct from creation. Their terminology therefore carries conclusions which have not been independently proven. (al Intiṣār lil Tadmuriyyah, p. 120.) For this reason, istifṣāl (asking for clarification) cannot be dismissed as an invalid method of discussion. Even if a term is clear to the person using it, that does not mean its meaning is agreed upon by his opponent. Demanding that someone accept unfamiliar terminology before examining its meaning gives one side control over the terms of the discussion. (al Intiṣār lil Tadmuriyyah, p. 121.) The objection becomes clearer in the claim that Ibn Taymiyyah may be described as affirming bodily qualities even if he does not expressly use such language, provided his statements are thought to imply it. But Ibn Taymiyyah expressly rejects describing Allah as a jism in the ordinary sense of an assembled body, or attributing bodily parts to Him. His refusal to affirm or deny these terms without clarification concerns their later technical meanings, which may include matters he affirms and others he rejects. (al Kāshif al Ṣaghīr, pp. 184–185, as quoted in al Intiṣār lil Tadmuriyyah, p. 122.) The Correct Method of Responding The method presented is to affirm what has come in the Qur'an and Sunnah as it has come, without taʾwīl or tafwīḍ, following the understanding of the Salaf. Terms which were not used in revelation or by the Salaf should not be adopted in either affirmation or negation without first examining their meanings. For example, when asked whether Allah possesses "physical uluww," the answer is to affirm His real elevation above creation, as expressed through the words of revelation concerning His being above, the ascent of affairs to Him and their descent from Him. There is no need to accept the opponent's terminology. Nor must one accept every consequence which the opponent claims follows from what has been affirmed. (al Intiṣār lil Tadmuriyyah, pp. 122–123.) Ibn Taymiyyah said: "Using these terms in either negation or affirmation is an innovation, and both involve ambiguity and misleading implications. Therefore, one must ask for clarification, or refrain from using either affirmation or negation." He then said that whoever is being compelled to accept an innovation may hold firmly to the Qur'an and Sunnah and answer: "I will not respond to you except according to the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His Messenger." (Darʾ Taʿāruḍ al ʿAql wa al Naql, Ibn Taymiyyah, 1/131–134.) Al Intiṣār lil Tadmuriyyah, Māhir Amīr, pp. 117–123.

The Refutation of the Claim That New Attributes Originate Within Allah's Essence & The Problem With the Ashʿarī Belief in One Eternal Will With No Particulars Saʿīd Foūdah's Accusation Against Ibn Taymiyyah Saʿīd Foūdah accused Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728 AH) of believing that new divine attributes continually originate within the Dhāt (Essence) of Allah. Foūdah argued that the mutakallimūn (speculative theologians) denied the occurrence of new attributes within Allah's Essence, believing that every attribute belonging to Allah must be eternal. He then attributed the contrary position to Ibn Taymiyyah, stating: "Ibn Taymiyyah, however, held that Allah's attributes occur successively, one after another, being originated in their individual instances but eternal in their kind, as with will and power." (Tanzīh al Raḥmān, Saʿīd Foūdah, p. 20) Saʿīd Foūdah also accused Ibn Taymiyyah of believing that Allah's attributes undergo change, connecting this accusation to his belief in the existence of time before the creation of the present world. Aḥmad ʿIṣām al Najjār rejects this accusation because it confuses the occurrence of individual divine acts with the origination of the attributes themselves. The Difference Between Eternal Attributes and Individual Divine Acts According to Ibn Taymiyyah, Allah has eternally possessed every attribute of perfection. The occurrence of a particular divine act does not mean that Allah acquires an attribute that He previously lacked. The distinction concerns the difference between an eternal ṣifah (attribute) and an individual fiʿl (act) performed through that attribute. For example, Allah eternally possesses the attribute of khalq (creation), but the creation of a particular thing occurs when Allah wills to create it. The occurrence of that act does not mean that Allah has newly acquired the attribute of creation. The same principle applies to irādah (will) and qudrah (power). Allah has always possessed these attributes, while particular acts occur according to His will. Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728 AH) explained: "He has always been willing through successive acts of willing. The kind of will is eternal, but He wills a particular thing at its appointed time." (Majmūʿ al Fatāwā, Ibn Taymiyyah, 16/302–303) This establishes the distinction between nawʿ al irādah (the kind of will), which is eternal, and irādāt muʿayyanah (particular acts of willing), which occur successively. The eternity of the kind means that Allah has always exercised His will, without an absolute beginning to successive acts of willing. However, each particular act concerns something Allah wills at its appointed time. Therefore, affirming successive acts of willing does not necessitate believing that Allah acquired a new attribute after previously lacking it. Ibn Taymiyyah's Rejection of the Karrāmī Position Aḥmad ʿIṣām al Najjār further refutes the accusation by establishing that Ibn Taymiyyah explicitly distinguished his position from that of the Karrāmīs. The Karrāmīs believed in a single eternal will while also affirming that additional acts of willing originate within Allah's Essence through that eternal will. Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728 AH) described their position: "They believe in one eternal will, as the others do, but say that when actions occur, new acts of willing arise within His Essence through that eternal will." (Majmūʿ al Fatāwā, Ibn Taymiyyah, 16/302–303) Although Ibn Taymiyyah considered their affirmation of particular acts of willing closer to the truth than the Ashʿarī denial of them, he nevertheless rejected their explanation. Their position still required ḥawādith bilā sabab ḥādith (new occurrences without a newly occurring cause) and takhṣīṣ bilā mukhaṣṣiṣ (specification without a specifying cause). Consequently, attributing the Karrāmī explanation to Ibn Taymiyyah ignores his explicit criticism of their doctrine and the distinction he established concerning Allah's eternal attributes. The Problem With the Ashʿarī Belief in One Eternal Will The disagreement becomes clearer when examining the Ashʿarī belief concerning Allah's irādah (will). Ibn Kullāb (d. approximately 240 AH), Abū al Ḥasan al Ashʿarī (d. 324 AH), and their followers believed that Allah possesses one eternal will that relates to everything He wills. According to this doctrine, the will itself does not involve successive particular acts of willing. Instead, only its taʿalluq (relation) to particular things occurs at different times. Ibn Taymiyyah refuted this belief since it fails to establish why a particular event occurs at its appointed time rather than another. If the eternal will remains unchanged and nothing new occurs to specify a particular outcome, the occurrence of that outcome would amount to takhṣīṣ bilā mukhaṣṣiṣ (specification without a specifying cause). (Majmūʿ al Fatāwā, Ibn Taymiyyah, 16/302–303) Abū al Barakāt al Baghdādī (d. approximately 560 AH) also questioned this doctrine, considering it unreasonable that numerous distinct things could be willed through a single, unchanging will without particular acts of willing. He questioned whether Allah's responses to supplication, acceptance of repentance, forgiveness, and dealings with His servants occur through His will. If these matters occur through His will, the question arises whether they are brought about through one eternal will without any further acts of willing. Denying that these matters occur through Allah's will would contradict the religious teachings concerning His commands, prohibitions, mercy, and response to His servants. Yet affirming particular acts of willing would contradict the Ashʿarī explanation. (Al Muʿtabar fī al Ḥikmah, Abū al Barakāt al Baghdādī, 3/47) Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728 AH) observed that Abū al Barakāt found this doctrine so unreasonable that he initially believed no rational theologian would accept it, although it was the position of Ibn Kullāb, al Ashʿarī, and their followers. (Darʾ Taʿāruḍ al ʿAql wa al Naql, Ibn Taymiyyah, 2/172) The fundamental objection is that the Ashʿarī doctrine fails to explain how distinct events occur at their appointed times without affirming particular acts of willing or a cause that specifies their occurrence. The Refutation of the Claim That Allah Acquires New Attributes of Perfection Saʿīd Foūdah's accusation depends upon treating the occurrence of successive divine acts as though it necessarily means that Allah acquires new attributes. However, these are two different matters. Tajaddud al afʿāl (the occurrence of successive acts) refers to particular divine acts occurring according to Allah's eternal will and power. Ḥudūth al ṣifāt baʿda ʿadamihā (the origination of attributes after their previous nonexistence) would mean that Allah acquires an attribute of perfection that He previously lacked. The second meaning is rejected because Allah has eternally possessed every attribute of perfection. If He acquired a new attribute of perfection after previously lacking it, this would imply that He had previously been without that perfection. However, the occurrence of successive divine acts does not require such a belief. For this reason, the expression irādāt ḥādithah (newly occurring acts of willing) requires clarification. Without distinguishing the eternal attribute from its particular acts, the expression may incorrectly suggest that Allah's attribute of will itself originated after previously being nonexistent. The more precise expression is irādāt muʿayyanah mutaʿāqibah li murādāt muʿayyanah (successive particular acts of willing directed towards particular things). Ibn Taymiyyah's position therefore affirms that Allah has eternally possessed His attributes while particular acts occur successively according to His will. The accusation that Ibn Taymiyyah believed in the origination of new attributes of perfection within Allah's Essence is therefore rejected because it confuses the occurrence of individual divine acts with the origination of the attributes themselves. (Masʾalat Ḥudūth al ʿĀlam bayna Ibn Taymiyyah wa al Falāsifah wa al Ilḥād al Muʿāṣir, Aḥmad ʿIṣām al Najjār, pp. 122–128)

This quote is actually taken from Risālah of ʿAbd al ʿAziz ibn ʿAbdullah al Majishun, I will present a much larger excerpt of the treatise that is fully translated, and we will see if the original quote actually aligns with what the Ashʿarīs believe. The Chain of the Risālah Abu al Fadl Jaʿfar ibn Muhammad al Qaflani (d. 325 AH) narrated to us, saying: Muhammad ibn Ishaq al Saghani (d. 270 AH) narrated to us, saying: ʿAbdullah ibn Salih (d. 223 AH) said: ʿAbd al ʿAziz ibn ʿAbdullah ibn Salamah al Majishun (d. 164 AH) dictated a statement to me, which he had written in response to my question concerning what the Jahmiyyah had introduced, and he said: "I have understood your question concerning what the Jahmiyyah and those who have allied themselves with them have pursued regarding the attributes of the Magnificent Lord, whose greatness is beyond all description and estimation. Tongues are incapable of fully explaining His attributes, and intellects fall short of comprehending His greatness. His majesty overwhelms the intellects, leaving them unable to find any way to COMPREHEND Him. Then they return humbled and exhausted. We have only been commanded to OBSERVE and REFLECT upon the things He has created according to His determination. The question, 'How did it come to be?' is only asked concerning something that once did not exist and then came into existence. Side Note: The preceding statement of the Imam explains this is a negation of Allah being examined, not that he is free from a kayf. [UNDERLINED TEXT] As for the One who does not change, does not cease to exist, has always existed, and has no likeness, none knows how He is except Himself. How could anyone COMPREHEND (yuʿrafu) the greatness of the One who has no beginning, who does not perish and does not die? And how could anything belonging to His attributes have a limit or an end that anyone could COMPREHEND (yaʿrifuhu), or whose extent anyone could describe? [END OF UNDERLINE] Side Note: The Ashʿarīs may also think the negation of change here refutes us, but it is an ambiguous term, this is further explained here nitter.gq/1athariarchive/status/… This is part of His majesty. He is the Clear and Manifest Truth. There is no truth greater than Him, and nothing more evident than Him. The proof that intellects are INCAPABLE OF FULLY COMPREHENDING His attributes is that they are incapable of fully comprehending the attributes of even the smallest of His creatures. You can scarcely see such a creature because of its tiny size, though it moves about and disappears from sight. You cannot perceive its hearing or sight, despite the way it moves and acts through its intelligence. Even what becomes apparent of its hearing and sight remains beyond your complete understanding and is hidden from you!! So blessed is Allah, the best of creators." (al Muminun 14)." End Quote.. Grading of this treatise: The report of ʿAbd al ʿAziz ibn ibn al Majishun has an authentic chain. Although ʿAbdullah ibn Salih had some weakness in his memory, this does not affect the report for two reasons. Firstly, he personally questioned Ibn al Majishun and narrated directly from him. Secondly, Ibn al Majishun dictated the statement to him, meaning its preservation depended on writing rather than memory. Yahya ibn Maʿin distinguished between reliability in memorisation and written records, saying: "Abu Salih, the scribe of al Layth, was reliable in his written records." (al Tahdhib, 5/260) Al Dhahabi also authenticated Ibn al Majishun's statement. (al ʿUluw, al Dhahabi, p. 141) Al Ibanah ʿan Shariʿat al Firqat al Najiyah, Ibn Battah, 7/63–64

Refuting the Ashʿarī Denial of Kayf for Allah The statements of the Salaf: bilā kayf (without describing how), lā yuqāl kayf (one does not ask how) and al kayf majhūl (the manner is unknown) do not negate that Allah's attributes possess a kayfiyyah. But they show the reality of his attributes, and actions, while withholding knowledge of their manner, which belongs to Allah alone. The mistakes the Ashʿarīs make in this issue, is treating the prohibition of asking about the kayfiyyah as a denial of its existence. ʿAbd al ʿAzīz ibn ʿAbdullāh al Mājishūn (d. 164AH) said: "The question of how is only asked concerning someone who did not previously exist and then came into existence. As for the One who has never ceased to exist, who does not change and who has no likeness, none knows how He is except Himself." His statement affirms that knowledge of Allah's manner belongs to Allah Himself. (Siyar Aʿlām al Nubalāʾ, al Dhahabī, as referenced on p. 151). Imam al Shāfiʿī (d. 204AH), in the creed attributed to him, said: "Allah is upon His Throne in His heaven. He draws near to His creation however He wills and descends to the lowest heaven however He wills." The words kayfa shāʾ (however He wills) affirms that Allah acts according to His will without describing how His actions occur. (Tafsīr al Qurʾān, al Samʿānī, 2/51). Abū ʿUbayd al Qāsim ibn Sallām (d. 224AH) said concerning the authentic reports about Allah's attributes: "These narrations are authentic. The scholars of hadith and jurisprudence have transmitted them from one another, and we believe they are true without doubting them. However, when someone asks, 'How does He place His Foot?' or 'How does He laugh?', we say that these matters are not to be explained, nor have we heard anyone explaining them." Thus, the reports are accepted without attempting to describe the manner of the attributes mentioned in them. (Kitāb al Ṣifāt, al Dāraquṭnī, pp. 68–69). The Imams Affirmed That Allah Acts However He Wills Ḥammād ibn Zayd (d. 179AH) was asked by Bishr ibn al Sarī concerning the hadith of Allah's descent whether Allah moves from one place to another. After remaining silent, he answered: "He is in His place and draws near to His creation however He wills." ʿAbdullāh ibn al Mubārak (d. 181AH), when asked how Allah descends, replied: "He descends however He wills." Neither answer attempts to describe the manner of the descent. (Siyar Aʿlām al Nubalāʾ, al Dhahabī, 9/333; al Asmāʾ wa al Ṣifāt, al Bayhaqī, 2/378). Abū al Muẓaffar al Samʿānī (d. 489AH) said: "The Hand is an attribute of Allah without describing how, and He has two Hands. It has authentically been reported that the Prophet ﷺ said, 'Both His Hands are right Hands.' Allah knows the manner intended." His statement explicitly leaves knowledge of the manner to Allah rather than denying it altogether. (Tafsīr al Qurʾān, al Samʿānī, 2/51). Ibn Khuzaymah (d. 311AH) affirmed the reports concerning Allah's descent and said: "We speak concerning these reports of descent without undertaking to describe its manner, since the Prophet ﷺ did not describe to us the manner of the descent." The absence of a hadith explanation concerning the manner is therefore the reason for refusing to describe it. (Kitāb al Tawḥīd, Ibn Khuzaymah, 1/289–290). Abū al Ḥasan al Ashʿarī the Ashʿarī Imam(d. 324AH) himself said: "Allah draws near to His servants however He wills." (al Ibānah ʿan Uṣūl al Diyānah, al Ashʿarī, p. 250). This wording is relevant to the claim that Allah's actions possess no manner whatsoever. The Manner Is Unknown, Not Nonexistent Abū Bakr al Ismāʿīlī (d. 371AH) affirmed the reports concerning Allah's attributes as they had been transmitted, without claiming knowledge of how they occur. His explanation was that the believers must accept what has been made clear and refrain from investigating what has not been explained. (ʿAqīdat al Salaf wa Aṣḥāb al Ḥadīth, al Ṣābūnī, p. 192). Ibn ʿAbd al Barr (d. 463AH) said: "We know through our reason and senses that we possess souls within our bodies, yet we do not know their manner. Our ignorance of the manner of our souls does not require that we have no souls. Our ignorance of how Allah is above His Throne does not require that He is not above His Throne." Thus, ignorance concerning the manner of something does not negate its reality. (al Tamhīd, Ibn ʿAbd al Barr, 7/137). Al Sarakhsī (d. 483AH) said: "What is unclear concerning the description does not invalidate knowledge of the original meaning. The Face and Hand, as Allah has affirmed in the Qur'an, are known in their original meaning, while their manner belongs to what is unknown." The meaning is therefore affirmed even though its kayfiyyah is not known. (Uṣūl al Sarakhsī, 1/170) Al Qurṭubī (d. 671AH) said concerning Allah's istiwāʾ (rising over the Throne): "None of the righteous Salaf denied that Allah rose over His Throne in reality. They were ignorant of the manner of His istiwāʾ, for its reality is not known to them." (Tafsīr al Qurṭubī, 7/219) This expressly distinguishes affirming the attribute from possessing knowledge of how it occurs. Ibn Ḥajar al ʿAsqalānī (d. 852AH) said: "They did not delve into Allah's attributes because they knew that doing so involved investigating a manner which cannot be known through reason, since reason has limits beyond which it cannot go." Their refusal therefore concerned investigating the manner, not denying that the attributes possess one. (Fatḥ al Bārī, Ibn Ḥajar, 17/293). Al Āmidī the Ashʿarī scholar (d. 631AH) said: "We accept that it is impossible for Allah to possess a manner resembling what is found in the observable world. However, what prevents Him from possessing a manner different from everything found in the observable world?" This distinction confirms that denying resemblance does not require denying the existence of a manner unlike that of creation. (Abkār al Afkār, al Āmidī, 1/506–508) The Meaning of Bilā Kayf in the Reports of the Salaf Imam Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241AH) said: "He descends however He wills, according to His knowledge and power. He has encompassed everything in knowledge." He also instructed the believers to accept the authentic reports concerning Allah's decree and attributes, saying: "One does not say 'Why?' or 'How?' Rather, one affirms them and believes in them." The first statement concerns Allah acting according to His will, while the second prohibits questioning what has not been disclosed. (Fatḥ al Bārī, Ibn Rajab, 3/117; Sharḥ Uṣūl Iʿtiqād Ahl al Sunnah, al Lālakāʾī, 1/175). Imam Mālik ibn Anas (d. 179AH) said: "One does not say 'How?', for the manner is withheld concerning Him." Isḥāq ibn Rāhawayh (d. 238AH), when questioned about how Allah descends every night, answered: "One does not ask how. Rather, He descends without describing how." The prohibition concerns asking about the manner of Allah's descent. (Siyar Aʿlām al Nubalāʾ, al Dhahabī; al ʿUluw, al Dhahabī, p. 179) Al Dāraquṭnī (d. 385AH) transmitted from al Walīd ibn Muslim that he asked al Awzāʿī (d. 157AH), Mālik ibn Anas, Sufyān al Thawrī (d. 161AH) and al Layth ibn Saʿd (d. 175AH) about the reports concerning seeing Allah and other attributes. They answered: "Transmit them without describing how." Al Tirmidhī (d. 279AH) also reported from scholars including Sufyān ibn ʿUyaynah (d. 198AH) and Ibn al Mubārak that these reports are narrated and believed in, without asking how. (Kitāb al Ṣifāt, al Dāraquṭnī, p. 44; Sunan al Tirmidhī, 5/101). Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā al Dhuhlī (d. 258AH) affirmed the authentic reports concerning seeing Allah, His descent, the grave, the Hereafter, Paradise and Hell. He said that believers must accept these reports even when their minds cannot comprehend their realities, saying: "They must believe in them and submit, without describing how or attempting to explain their manner." (Iʿrāb al Qurʾān, al Naḥḥās, 5/57). Since several of these reports concern created things whose existence and meanings are known, bilā kayf cannot mean that they possess no manner whatsoever. Seeing Allah Without Knowing How Imam al Ṭaḥāwī (d. 321AH) said: "Seeing Allah is true for the people of Paradise, without encompassing Him and without describing how." This affirms ruʾyah (seeing Allah) while denying that creation comprehends its manner. Al Bābartī (d. 786AH) explained: "Seeing itself is something that occurs to us, and it must have a manner. However, we do not know its manner, nor do we know how it occurs." He also said that attempting to determine its precise reality leads to error, while belief requires accepting what has been revealed without attempting to describe what remains unknown. (al Sharḥ al Kabīr ʿalā al ʿAqīdah al Ṭaḥāwiyyah, al Bābartī, p. 671). The statements of the Salaf distinguish between denying kayfiyyah and denying knowledge of it. Imam Mālik, Imam Aḥmad, Ibn al Mubārak, Ibn Khuzaymah and some of their own scholars affirmed Allah's attributes while leaving the kayfiyyah to Allah. Simply put, using the statements of the Salaf to deny that Allah's attributes possess any manner whatsoever confuses the absence of knowledge with the absence of reality. Al Intiṣār lil Tadmurīyyah by Māhir Amīr, pp. 151–158

Qadr al Mushtarak: The Shared Meaning of Allah’s Names and Attributes Allah has described Himself with names and attributes that are also used for His creation, such as life, knowledge, power, hearing, seeing, will and love. However, sharing a name or attribute does not mean that Allah and His creation are alike in their reality. Allah's life is not like the life of His servants, His knowledge is not like their knowledge, and His hearing and seeing are not like theirs. Each possesses what is particular to him, while the general meaning of the attribute remains understood. This is the foundation of qadr mushtarak (a shared meaning). (Manhaj al Sunnah, Ibn Taymiyyah, 2/595–596; Mawqif Ibn Taymiyyah min al Ashāʿirah, pp. 964–967). The names and attributes are distinguished through three forms of meaning. Ishtirāk lafẓī (sharing the same wording) occurs when one word has entirely different meanings, such as ʿayn (eye), which may refer to the eye, a spring of water or gold. Tawāṭuʾ (a shared general meaning) applies when one meaning is common to several individuals, such as the word "human" applying to Zayd and ʿAmr, although each possesses his own reality. Tashkīk (a shared meaning that differs in degree) applies when one possesses an attribute more strongly than another, such as the light of the sun compared with the light of a lamp. The common meaning between Allah and His creation belongs to the latter discussion of shared meanings, not to words whose meanings are entirely unrelated. (Manhaj al Sunnah, Ibn Taymiyyah, 2/592–596; Mawqif Ibn Taymiyyah min al Ashāʿirah, pp. 965–967). Qadr mushtarak exists in the mind as a general understanding, not as one reality shared between Allah and His creation in the external world. The meaning of existence can be understood without the existence of Allah being identical to that of His servants. So, knowing what hearing, seeing and life mean does not require their realities to be alike. The general meaning is understood, but each possesses his own particular attributes. (Manhaj al Sunnah, Ibn Taymiyyah, 2/581–586; Naqḍ al Taʾsīs, Ibn Taymiyyah, 2/378–379). The Errors of Treating Shared Meaning as Just A Commonality In The Wording The majority of scholars, including the Ashʿarīs, affirmed that Allah's names and attributes have true meanings, even when the same names are used for His creation. However, Abū al ʿAbbās al Nāshiʾ said that these names were used in their true sense for Allah and metaphorically for His creation, while others reversed this position. The Jahmiyyah, Qarāmiṭah and Bāṭiniyyah were extremein their negation of Allah's names and attributes. If the names were shared in wording alone, describing Allah as living or knowing would provide no understanding of His attributes, just as unfamiliar words whose meanings are unknown provide no understanding. This would amount to ilḥād (deviation) concerning Allah's names. (al Jawāb al Ṣaḥīḥ, Ibn Taymiyyah, 3/150; Manhaj al Sunnah, Ibn Taymiyyah, 3/586; Darʾ Taʿāruḍ al ʿAql wa al Naql, Ibn Taymiyyah, 5/325–326). Those who denied the common meaning relied upon two doubts. The first was tashbīh, believing that affirming existence, life or knowledge for both would require them to be alike. The second was tarkīb (composition), believing that they would possess one common existence together with something particular to each. Both arguments depend upon believing the general meaning understood in the mind as though it were a single reality existing outside the mind. However, Allah has His own existence, and each created being has its own existence. Nothing in the external world is jointly possessed by them as one identical reality. (Manhaj al Sunnah, Ibn Taymiyyah, 2/581–585). Al Rāzī (d. 606AH), al Āmidī (d. 631AH) and al Shahrastānī (d. 548AH) fell into errors concerning kulliyyāt (universal meanings), the belief that a universal meaning could exist in the external world as part of particular things. This confused what exists in the mind with what exists in reality. Al Āmidī affirmed the common universal outside the mind in Daqāʾiq al Ḥaqāʾiq, but denied it in Iḥkām al Aḥkām, while al Rāzī also rejected it in al Mulakhkhaṣ. Their contradictory statements arose from failing to distinguish the general meaning from its particular existence. (Darʾ Taʿāruḍ al ʿAql wa al Naql, Ibn Taymiyyah, 5/108–126; Manhaj al Sunnah, Ibn Taymiyyah, 2/588–592). The Consequences for Allah's Attributes The Ashʿarīs interpreted Allah's maḥabbah (love) as His will to bestow favour, arguing that love means the inclination of the heart towards the beloved, which is a characteristic of created beings. However, human will is also understood as the inclination of the soul towards what is desired. Therefore, the same reasoning used to interpret love would also require them to interpret will. Whatever distinction they make between Allah's will and the will of His servants must also be applied to His love and the love of His servants. (Mawqif Ibn Taymiyyah min al Ashāʿirah, p. 972). Allah's names and attributes are of different kinds. Some belong exclusively to Him, such as al Ilāh (the One worthy of worship) and Rabb al ʿĀlamīn (Lord of the worlds). Others, such as life, knowledge and power, may also describe created beings, although the reality of each differs according to the one possessing it. The general meaning of these attributes is a quality of perfection, while their particular reality belongs to the one described. They do not exist independently of the one possessing them. Allah's attributes therefore subsist in Him, just as the attributes of created beings subsist in them, without requiring any likeness between their realities. (Manhaj al Sunnah, Ibn Taymiyyah, 2/596–598; al Jawāb al Ṣaḥīḥ, Ibn Taymiyyah, 2/323). This is understood through the principle that what is said concerning Allah's attributes follows what is said concerning His essence. Just as affirming Allah's existence does not require knowing the kayfiyyah affirming His attributes does not require knowing their manner. The attributes are affirmed according to their meanings without takyīf, tamthīl, taḥrīf or taʿṭīl. To deny every common meaning between Allah and His creation would ultimately lead to denying Allah's existence, since even the meaning of existence would no longer be understood. (al Tadmuriyyah, Ibn Taymiyyah, pp. 43–46; Majmūʿ al Fatāwā, Ibn Taymiyyah, 5/114). The Examples of Paradise and the Soul The difference between a shared meaning and its particular reality can be understood through the descriptions of Paradise. Ibn ʿAbbās رضي الله عنه said, "There is nothing in this world of what is in Paradise except the names." (Jami al Bayan, al Tabari, 1/391, report 534, under al Baqarah 25 quran.ksu.edu.sa/tafseer/tab…) Paradise contains food, drink, clothing, gold, silver and other things whose names are known in this world, yet their true realities are different. The meanings of these descriptions are understood without requiring the things described to be identical. If such differences exist between created things, then the difference between the Creator and His creation is far greater. (Majmūʿ al Fatāwā, Ibn Taymiyyah, 5/208; al Tadmuriyyah, Ibn Taymiyyah, pp. 46–50). The rūḥ (spirit) is another example. It is described as living, knowing, hearing, seeing, ascending and descending, although its reality and the manner of these attributes are not known through direct observation. The absence of this knowledge does not prevent the meanings from being understood. If the attributes of a created soul can be affirmed without knowing their particular manner or likening them to the attributes of other created beings, then Allah is far more deserving of having His attributes affirmed without such likeness. (Majmūʿ al Fatāwā, Ibn Taymiyyah, 5/115–116; al Tadmuriyyah, Ibn Taymiyyah, p. 50). The same principle applies to the descriptions of Allah's attributes and the descriptions of the Hereafter. The mutakallimūn who affirmed Paradise and the Fire while interpreting Allah's attributes differently contradicted themselves, since both concern realities whose meanings can be understood without knowing their exact nature. The Malāḥidah (heretics) denied both, while Ahlus Sunnah affirmed both according to the texts. So, the common meaning of an attribute does not require resemblance in its reality, nor does the absence of knowledge concerning its manner justify denying what Allah has affirmed for Himself. (al Tadmuriyyah, Ibn Taymiyyah, pp. 46–50; Majmūʿ al Fatāwā, Ibn Taymiyyah, 5/348; Minhāj al Sunnah, Ibn Taymiyyah, 2/157–159). Mawqif Ibn Taymiyyah min al Ashāʿirah, Dr. ʿAbd al Raḥmān ibn Ṣāliḥ al Maḥmūd, pp. 964–978.

Imam Ibn Al Qayyim On The Claim That Allah Cannot Perform New Actions The term ḥulūl al ḥawādith is used by some mutakallimūn to deny that Allah speaks, acts, or wills something by His power and choice at a particular time. According to this belief, affirming such actions would mean that Allah is subject to change. This leads them to deny that Allah descends to the lowest heaven every night, comes on the Day of Resurrection, or rises over His Throne after not having been established upon it. (Sahih al Bukhari 1145; al Fajr 22; al Aʿraf 54) They also deny that Allah performs an action that was not occurring before, wills something after not having willed that particular thing, or actually says "Be" when bringing something into existence. All these actions are rejected because they regard their occurrence as a form of change. (al Ṣawāʿiq al Mursalah, 1/580). Allah's Anger, Pleasure, and Speech The same reasoning can also be applied to Allah's anger and pleasure, (which is partially the reason they have to reduce these two attributes into one, being His will). They deny that Allah becomes angry after having been pleased, or becomes pleased after having been angry. This includes His anger on the Day of Resurrection, which is described as an anger unlike any before it or after it. (Sahih al-Bukhari 4712; Sahih Muslim 194) They also deny that Allah calls His servants on the Day of Resurrection after not having called them, or responds to the worshipper during the recitation of Sūrat al Fātiḥah by saying, "My servant has praised Me," "My servant has extolled Me," and "My servant has glorified Me." (Sahih Muslim 395a) The reason for rejecting these matters is that they involve speech, actions, anger, or pleasure occurring at particular times. Such occurrences are treated as changes that cannot be affirmed for Allah. What Is Actually Meant by Denying Change Some of the mutakallimūn use statements such as "We declare Allah free from multiplicity, limitation, and renewal." A person hearing this might understand tajaddud (renewal) to mean that Allah's Lordship or His being Allah begins anew. However, what they actually intend by denying renewal is that no new action, will, or speech can occur through His power and choice. Others shorten their statement to "We declare Allah free from multiplicity and change." The listener might understand taghayyur (change) to mean Allah does Istiḥālah (goes through one condition to another). However, the intended meaning is the denial of Allah's attributes and actions altogether. The problem, is that expressions which appear to deny change in Allah are being used to deny His acting, willing, and speaking according to His will and power. Al Ṣawāʿiq al Mursalah fī al Radd ʿalā al Jahmiyyah wa al Muʿaṭṭilah, Ibn al Qayyim, pp. 935–937

Al Rāzī's Argument From Change and Its Refutation From Ibn Taymiyyah When Ibrāhīm عليه السلام saw a celestial body set, he said: "When it set, he said, 'I do not love those that set.'" (al Anʿām: 76) Al Rāzī argues that al afūl (setting) means al taghayyur (change). Since Ibrāhīm عليه السلام rejected what sets, this supposedly proves that anything subject to change cannot be Allah. The First Refutation: Setting Does Not Mean Change The first problem is that there is no proof that afūl (setting) means taghayyur (change). This meaning has only been asserted, without any evidence establishing that the two words mean the same thing. Therefore, the argument cannot be established by assuming the very meaning that needs to be proven. (Majmūʿ al Fatāwā, Ibn Taymiyyah, 13/284). The Second Refutation: The Meaning of Setting in the Arabic Language The claim contradicts the established meaning of al afūl (setting) among the scholars of the Arabic language and Tafsīr. The word means al ghaybūbah (disappearing from sight). The sun is described here as setting when it disappears, not whenever it goes through a change. For example, if the sun changes colour while remaining visible, it is not said to have set. Likewise, the moon is not described as having set whenever it moves across the sky. Even when the moon becomes hidden by clouds, or the sun is obscured during an eclipse, these circumstances do not establish the meaning of setting intended in the verse. The meaning of the word is disappearance from sight, not every occurrence of change. (Majmūʿ al Fatāwā, Ibn Taymiyyah, 13/284–285). The Third Refutation: Ibrāhīm عليه السلام Did Not Reject the Celestial Bodies When They Moved!! The story of Ibrāhīm عليه السلام contains more evidence against interpreting setting as change. When he saw the star, it was already moving towards the place where it would set. But he did not describe it as having set while it was moving. He only described it as setting after it disappeared. The same applies to the moon and the sun. Both were moving before they disappeared, yet neither was described as having set until its actual setting. If movement itself constituted afūl (setting), then the celestial bodies would already have been setting while they remained visible. This is contrary to the sequence established in the Qur'an. (Majmūʿ al Fatāwā, Ibn Taymiyyah, 13/285). The Fourth Refutation: Movement and Change Are Not Identical to Setting! Afūl (setting), ḥarakah (movement), and taghayyur (change) do not have the same meaning. Something may change without setting, and something may move without disappearing from sight. Even the meaning of movement differs according to its usage. It may refer to movement from one place to another, growth in plants, or changes connected with love, pleasure, anger and recollection. Likewise, change can refer to different kinds of occurrences. It cannot be assumed that everything described as changing undergoes the particular kind of change meant by another expression. So, using the word "change" does not establish the argument. If it refers to something that is agreed to be impossible for Allah, there is no disagreement concerning that particular matter. However, if it refers to the very matter being disputed, its impossibility must first be proven. (Majmūʿ al Fatāwā, Ibn Taymiyyah, 13/285–286). The Fifth Refutation: Setting Cannot Mean the Possibility of Nonexistence Ibn Sīnā (d. 428AH), interpreted afūl (setting) as imkān (its existence is not necessary, this is Ibn Sina's definition of the term in al Ilāhiyyāt). According to him, everything other than Allah is subject to the possibility of ceasing to exist. Therefore, every created thing would always possess the characteristic of setting, whether visible or hidden. However, this contradicts the Qur'an. Ibrāhīm عليه السلام first saw the celestial body appear. Only after it set did he say, "I do not love those that set." If setting meant the possibility of nonexistence, then the star, moon and sun would have possessed that description even before their setting. There would be no reason to connect his statement specifically to the moment when they disappeared. The Qur'an distinguishes between their appearance and their setting. The argument therefore cannot be based upon a meaning that removes this distinction. (Majmūʿ al Fatāwā, Ibn Taymiyyah, 13/286–287). Majmūʿ Fatāwā, compiled by ibn Qāsim, 13/284–287

Ibrāhīm Rafīq on Eternal and Renewed Knowledge, and Does This Mean Allah Gains Knowledge? Ibrāhīm Rafīq mentions here that we believe in two kinds of knowledge:ʿIlm al Azalī (Eternal Knowledge) and ʿIlm al Mutajaddid (Renewed Knowledge). Allah has always known everything before its existence. However, when something that Allah eternally knew would happen actually comes into existence, He possesses renewed knowledge of it as something that now exists. This is called Tajaddud al ʿIlm. This renewed knowledge subsists in Allah's Essence when the event occurs, whereas His eternal knowledge concerned that same event before its occurrence. Renewed knowledge does not mean Allah was ignorant, acquired information, increased in knowledge, or discovered something He did not already know. Rather ʿilm al mutajaddid is preceded by al ʿilm al azalī, which perfectly encompasses everything. The distinction concerns what exists and what does not exist. Ibrāhīm Rafīq supports this through several verses, including Allah's statement, "So that Allah may know those who believe." (Surah Al Imran, 3:140). He also mentions, "While Allah has not yet known those among you who strive and those who are patient." (Surah Al Imran, 3:142), and "We will certainly test you until We know those among you who strive." (Surah Muhammad, 47:31). These verses cannot mean Allah was previously unaware of who would believe, strive, or remain patient, because He knew all of them eternally. Rather, they establish renewed knowledge of their actions when those actions actually occur. The wisdom of renewed knowledge concerns Ḥisāb (Reckoning), thawāb (Reward), and ʿiqāb (Punishment). Allah does not hold people accountable just because He eternally knew what they would do. Rather, He holds them accountable for actions they performed and which He witnessed when they occurred. For example, a servant is not punished simply because Allah knew from eternity that the servant would commit a sin, but because the servant actually committed that sin. This shows Allah's perfect justice, since accountability concerns what people have actually done, not merely what was eternally known about their future actions. He applies this principle when discussing the children of the polytheists, explaining that they should not be considered deserving of punishment simply because Allah knew what they would have done had they lived. Nevertheless, there is ikhtilaaf concerning their ultimate fate and the Shaykh refrains from giving a definite conclusion. I made an article on this issue and the different views – athari-archive.com/2025/08/2… Affirming renewed knowledge is consistent with Ṣifāt al Ikhtiyāriyyah (Allah's Voluntary Attributes), which occur according to His will and subsist in His Essence. There are three incorrect positions. The extreme Qadariyyah denied Allah's prior knowledge and claimed that He only knew events after they occurred, thereby attributing ignorance to Him. Some philosophers affirmed kulliyyāt (universals) while denying Allah's detailed knowledge of juzʾiyyāt (particulars), but some defenders of these philosophers interpret their position differently. The Ashʿarīs and Māturīdīs, affirm Allah's eternal knowledge of everything but deny that renewed knowledge subsists in His Essence, because they reject the occurrence of voluntary attributes within His Essence. Their position mistreats Allah's knowledge of something before its existence and knowledge of it after its existence as one undifferentiated reality. Affirming renewed knowledge entails no deficiency in Allah whatsoever, because it is never preceded by ignorance, but by perfect, certain, and eternal knowledge. Ibn Taymiyyah has extensive refutations to the Aristotle, Ibn Sina, Ibn Rushd, Abu Hamid al Ghazali, Fakhr al Din al Razi, and the extreme Qadariyyah, on this issue. I summarised his refutations in the article below since the content on this, is far too lengthy to translate. athari-archive.com/2026/10/2…

Ibn Qudāmah's main issue with Abū Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī was was the doctrine of kalām nafsī, not his personal affairs. Ibn Qudāmah did, however, state that Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī was "A man who was not known for religion, piety, or any knowledge of the religious sciences whatsoever. Nor was he associated with any knowledge apart from the blameworthy science of ʿilm al kalām". (al Munazarah fi al Qur'an, Ibn Qudamah, p. 51) Haroun Kanj believes that Ibn Qudāmah was influenced by Sijzī and others to hate Abū Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, but he agrees with al-Ashʿarī on kalām Allah, but also writes extensive refutations against kalām nafsī?? You see how incoherent this claim is...?? He then says all of the following statements in his tweet are in agreement with the Ashʿarī school, now lets see if this is true. The first is of Ibn Qudāmah saying Allah's speech is eternal. Ibn Qudāmah (d. 620 AH) said [slightly abridged translation]: Among the attributes of Allah, the Most High, is that He speaks with eternal speech, which He permits whomever He wills from His creation to hear directly from Him. Musa عليه السلام heard His speech directly from Him, without any intermediary, as did those among His angels and messengers whom He granted permission to hear it. Furthermore, Allah, Glorified and Exalted is He, will speak to the believers in the Hereafter, and they will speak to Him. He will also grant them permission to visit Him. Allah, the Most High, says, "And Allah spoke directly to Musa." (al Nisa 164). He also uses al A'raf 144; al Baqarah 253; al Shura 51; Ta Ha 11–12, 14 as proofs. He then said: It is not permissible for anyone other than Allah to make such a statement. Abdullah ibn Mas'ud (d. 32 AH), may Allah be pleased with him, said, "When Allah speaks with revelation, the inhabitants of heaven hear His voice, resembling the sound of a chain being dragged across a smooth stone." (al Sunnah, Abdullah ibn Ahmad 536). A narration concerning this has also been reported from the Prophet ﷺ. (Sunan Abi Dawud 4738). Abdullah ibn Unays (d. 54 AH), may Allah be pleased with him, narrated that the Prophet ﷺ said, "Allah will gather all creation on the Day of Resurrection, barefoot, naked, uncircumcised, and possessing nothing. He will then call out to them with a voice that those who are far away will hear just as clearly as those who are near: 'I am the King. I am the Judge who gives everyone their due.'" (Musnad Ahmad 16042). This hadith was narrated by the leading scholars of hadith, and al Bukhari (d. 256 AH) also mentioned it as supporting evidence. [Shortened translation]: The Prophet ﷺ stated that Allah will call out to all creation on the Day of Resurrection with a voice heard equally by those near and far. (Musnad Ahmad, 16042). It is also reported that Musa عليه السلام heard Allah's voice and asked whether Allah was speaking directly or through a messenger. Allah replied, "Rather, it is My speech, O Musa." Shaykh ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Nāṣir al-Barrāk said: Regarding the Ibn Qudāmah's statement, "Among the attributes of Allah, the Most High, is that He speaks with eternal speech," it appears from his wording, may Allah have mercy upon him, that he inclines towards the position of the Salimiyyah. Side Note: Haroun Kanj claimed to agree with Ibn Qudāmah here, but when the context is taken into account, we see that his view was that Allah's words and letters are eternal, not that it is an eternal "speech" without words or letters as they claim. The Salimiyyah say that Allah's speech consists of letters and sounds, but that these letters and sounds are eternal. According to their position, Allah's speech is not connected to His will. Rather, His will is connected only to making His speech heard by whomever He wills. According to their understanding, Allah causes whomever He wills to hear His eternal speech. So what Musa عليه السلام heard was the eternal speech of Allah, which, according to their claim, subsists in His Essence. They consider His speech to be like His life, hearing, and sight, which are attributes that subsist in His Essence. Therefore, according to them, Allah has always been described as possessing this very speech, which has eternally subsisted in Him. However, the correct position, which is established by both reason and the revealed texts, is that Allah's speech is eternal in its kind (Qadim al Naw'), while its individual instances occur at particular times. This means that Allah has always spoken whatever He wills, whenever He wills, and however He wills. As for the individual instances of His speech, they occur at their appointed times, in accordance with His will. (Irshad al ʿIbad ila Maʿani Lumʿat al Iʿtiqad, Shaykh al Barrak, pp. 49–51) Haroun Kanj then quotes Ibn Qudāmah saying: "Agreement in the fundamental reality of an attribute does not constitute anthropomorphism." But leaves out the part where Ibn Qudāmah is refuting kalām nafsī. Ibn Qudamah says in full: "As for their claim that the speech of Allah, the Most High, must not consist of letters lest it resemble the speech of humans, we reply to this in several ways. (al Baqillani makes this exact argument in al Insaf) First: Agreement in the fundamental reality of something does not constitute tashbīh. Just as agreement concerning sight in the perception of visible things, hearing in the perception of audible things, and knowledge in the perception of things known does not constitute tashbīh, the same applies here. Second: If this were considered tashbīh, then their own tashbīh would be even more objectionable and more severe, as we have already explained (that the Ashʿarī understanding of kalām nafsī can also be likened to fikr (thinking), tarawwī (deliberation), and hadīth al nafs)" (Al Sirat al Mustaqim fi Ithbat al Harf al Qadim, by Ibn Qudamah, p. 43) When Haroun Kanj mentions that the difference between the Hanbalis and the Ashʿarīs is semantical, he again conveniently leaves out where Ibn Qudamah refutes them. All the quotes Haroun Kanj has brought, in context refute kalām nafsī... Ibn Qudamah says [slightly abridged]: "We agree that Mūsā عليه السلام heard the speech of Allāh directly from Allāh Himself, not from a tree, a stone, or anything else. If he had heard it from someone other than Allāh, the Children of Israel would have been superior to him in this respect, since they heard from Mūsā, who would have been greater than the one from whom Mūsā himself heard. Why, then, would Mūsā have been called kalīm al Raḥmān (the one to whom the Most Merciful spoke)? Once this has been established, the speech that Mūsā عليه السلام heard could only have consisted of ṣawt (voice) and ḥarf (letters). For if it had merely been an internal meaning, a thought, or a reflection, it would not have constituted Allāh speaking to Mūsā, nor would Mūsā have heard it, since thought does not extend beyond the mind, nor could it have been described as a calling. If they say, 'We do not call it a voice, even though it is heard,' we reply in several ways. First: This is merely a disagreement in wording while agreeing in meaning, for by ṣawt (voice), we mean nothing other than that which is heard. Second: The word ṣawt (voice) has been mentioned in the narrations and reports! (al Ṣirāṭ al Mustaqīm fī Ithbāt al Ḥarf al Qadīm, Ibn Qudāmah, 46–47) Conclusion Simply put Haroun Kanj has taken Ibn Qudāmah's statements out of context to make them appear consistent with the Ashʿarī position. First, Ibn Qudāmah affirms that Allah's speech is eternal, and he erred in this issue since his view was in alignment with the Salimiyyah, but he also explicitly affirms that it consists of letters and sounds. This contradicts the Ashʿarī doctrine of kalām nafsī. Second, Ibn Qudāmah argues that sharing a fundamental meaning does not constitute tashbīh. He uses this argument specifically to refute the Ashʿarī objection that affirming letters in Allah's speech would make it resemble human speech. Third, Ibn Qudāmah only describes the disagreement concerning ṣawt (voice) as verbal when both of us agree on what is actually heard, but he leaves out where Ibn Qudāmah argues that Mūsā عليه السلام heard Allah's speech consisting of letters and sounds, which again contradicts the belief of kalām nafsī The very statements Haroun Kanj presents as evidence of agreement with the Ashʿarīs "in some principles" are actually part of Ibn Qudāmah's refutation of them. Reading his statements in context makes this clear. Not only that but he ignored the proofs of Allah having a voice, and still decides to take the view that a voice cannot be attributed to Allah. The Ashʿarīs do not care about the Qur'an and Sunnah, they would rather blindly follow their scholars on views that clearly go against the nusus.