旧名AS-22 ロシア軍が構築している塹壕をデータ化してました。 紛争、自然災害等も衛星画像を使って観察してます。IMINT,OSINT,GEOINT
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専門家じゃない人が書いちゃいけないような分析まで書いちゃってるから、参考程度に見てほしいです。
本文は12,000字程度です。
ロシア防空システムの大規模再配置 ―衛星画像から見るS-300/400の移動とドクトリンの変容― note.com/happy_lotus194/n/nc…
Asuw retweeted
Ukrainian automated air defense turrets have shot down more than 60 Russian aerial targets under the Private Air Defense project, including dozens over Kyiv in the past month, according to Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense.
Interestingly, the ministry confirms that these turrets have also intercepted Russian jet-powered Bandеrol and Geran-5 drones.
Asuw retweeted
The Google Earth you love is now on web. Check out our new video guide on moving your work from Google Earth desktop to the web. goo.gle/4iNvmIM
Thanks to feedback from our community, some of your top requests have already shipped: circle measurements, elevation profiles, project search, CSV and shapefile imports, a rebuilt Local KML editor, and we're just getting started. Our guide covers how Google Earth on the web is built for professional workflows, how you can inform what we build next, how to work locally, and more!
Asuw retweeted
$100 million: Neptune destroys two enemy Su-34s
The destruction of two enemy Su-34 aircraft at Marinovka airfield, in the area of Oktyabrsky, Volgograd Oblast, russia, on 29 October 2026 has been confirmed following a strike by missile troops – specifically, Neptune coastal missile systems of the Ukrainian Navy.
The Su-34 fighter-bomber is the main platform for dropping guided aerial bombs (KABs). It can carry up to 8 tonnes of ordnance.
The market value of one Su-34 is about USD 50 million.
The destruction of such aircraft reduces the enemy’s ability to strike Ukraine’s frontline areas, civilian infrastructure and our warriors’ forward positions with KABs.
To be continued.
Glory to Ukraine!
Asuw retweeted
⚡️🛩️BREAKING: Two Russian Su-34 fighter-bombers were destroyed in a strike on Marinovka military airfield in Volgograd Oblast, Russia, on October 29, according to Dossier Shpiona.
The airfield is used by Russia’s 11th Composite Aviation Regiment.
Two Russian servicemen were killed and two others wounded in the attack, according to the same source.
少し調べてみると、エカリテンブルクの70th ArsenalとクジェンキノのAmmunition and Equipment Depotでも同じ構造の施設があった。
livingatlas.arcgis.com/wayba…
Asuw retweeted
According to official data from Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence (@DI_Ukraine), Russia’s Aerospace Forces had approximately 140 Su-34 fighter-bombers of various modifications in service as of October 22, 2026.
The Su-34 is Russia’s primary platform for launching guided glide bombs (KABs) against Ukrainian positions and cities.
Asuw retweeted
New satellite imagery obtained by RFE/RL shows Russia has expanded Gvardiiske airfield in occupied Crimea into a drone-launch hub. Ukrainian military sources say the base was first identified as a launch site in March 2025 and now sends out strike drones almost daily. Imagery from October 11 shows no visible aircraft but extensive new infrastructure and dozens of unidentified objects in the airfield’s southwest. #Crimea
Asuw retweeted
Leaked fragments of the document cementing the local humanitarian ceasefire beteeen Russian and Ukrainian forces around Russia-occupied town of Oleshky in Ukraine's Kherson Oblast.
Acccording to the agreement, Ukrainian citizens who expressed a desire to return to non-occupied parts of Ukraine were set to be evacuated to the Anapa Airport in southern Russia, and then transported to Homel in southern Belarus on a Russian military transport plane.
U.S. First Lady Melania Trump says that the geographical area of the humanitarian ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine has expanded beyond Russia-occupied town of Oleshky, within Ukraine's Kherson Oblast, to provide safe passage for the humanitarian convoys.
The limited truce is set to last from October 27, 2026, 01:00am UTC, until November 1, 2026, 8:59pm UTC.
Asuw retweeted
🚨🚨🚨 What could be the largest Russian military sealift operation observed so far in 2026 may already be underway from Baltiysk.
A fourth cargo vessel, 🇷🇺 LADY R (IMO 9161003), was identified on October 23 satellite imagery at Baltiysk, reportedly loading military equipment, joining ASCALON, LADY D and ANASTASIIA.
The vessels could be heading to 🇱🇾 Tobruk (ETA Nov 8-9) or 🇹🇬 Lome (ETA Nov 13-14), assuming an October 24 departure at 10 knots. 🇬🇳 Conakry also remains a possibility.
🇷🇺 SPARTA (IMO 9268710) may also be involved. After delivering military cargo to Tartus, it called at St Petersburg on Oct 11 before heading to Baltiysk, potentially carrying equipment for onward shipment.
Asuw retweeted
On October 27, 2024, servicemen from Rogue Team and Omega Team of the GUR International Legion were tasked with locating and eliminating Russian FSB and SOF DRG groups conducting cross-border ambushes in Ukraine’s Chernihiv and Sumy Oblasts.
During the mission, the teams attempted to infiltrate enemy territory but encountered a fortified Russian position near the village of Brahlov in Bryansk Oblast.
According to Rogue Team fighter with the callsign "Snow," they had expected a trench position but instead came across a heavily fortified underground bunker with trenches and eight firing positions. "It was like Fort Knox," - "Snow" recalls.
Rogue Team split into two main teams: Alpha and Bravo. Rogue Alpha and Omega Team assaulted the fortification from the treeline west of Rogue Bravo.
Rogue Bravo then split into two groups, with one advancing to assault the fortification while the other remained behind to provide covering fire. The actions of Rogue Bravo were captured on video by one of its fighters, callsign "Uno."
At 05:05, the fighters launched an assault from two directions, throwing grenades into the Russian positions and attempting to storm the fortification. However, they were met with heavy Russian fire. This marked the beginning of the operation's most difficult moments.
- Rogue Alpha, which was attacking the fortification from the treeline, came under Russian machine-gun fire and lost two fighters (off-screen). The team leader, Bradley Carl Jennison, callsign "Super Dave," was shot in the chest and died at the scene. Reportedly, Simon Petrik Rajakisto, callsign "Rauta," was wounded in an open field and could not be evacuated due to heavy Russian fire, so he blew himself up to avoid capture.
- 16:45 Somewhere around this time, Rogue Bravo fighters again attempted to enter the bunker but failed.
- At 17:38 Canadian volunteer Mandeep Singh, callsign "Poet" moved into the open and was wounded by small-arms fire. His comrade, American volunteer Corey John Nawrocki, then attempted to reach "Poet" and drag him to safety under covering fire from the cameraman, but Russian fire killed both men.
- 20:24 While attempting to help them, one of the fighters was wounded in the head, possibly in the neck area. With only two fighters remaining at the position, they decided to withdraw to the rear position where the second Rogue Bravo group was stationed and requested covering fire, but received no response.
- 22:14 The fighters began retreating under Russian fire. Possibly due to communication problems, their comrades only began providing covering fire at the last moment.
- 23:20 The fighters provided first aid to the wounded man and spent the next few minutes trying to contact Omega and Rogue Alpha to request covering fire for their withdrawal.
- 32:17 Due to communication problems, the fighters were unable to contact their comrades. However, they spotted members of Omega Team in the treeline and decided to cross the open field directly in front of the Russian positions.
- 33:07 The cameraman crosses the open field under Russian fire and enters the treeline.
- 35:07 The fighters began retreating through the forested area as Russian forces pursued them. In addition to the difficult terrain, they also encountered barbed wire. One of the fighters got caught on the wire, forcing the group to stop for several minutes.
- 42:11 The fighters eventually regrouped with other teams.
- 1:10:30 After regrouping with other groups and resting briefly, the soldiers began their withdrawal toward Ukrainian territory.
Rogue Team lost four fighters during the operation.
🛡 Bradley Carl Jennison, "Super Dave" - 🇺🇸
🛡 Simon Petrik Rajakisto, "Rauta" - 🇸🇪
🛡 Mandeep Singh, "Poet" - 🇨🇦
🛡 Corey John Nawrocki, "Corey" - 🇺🇸
Unfortunately, their bodies could not be recovered at that time. May they rest in peace, and may their sacrifice never be forgotten.
Asuw retweeted
From the waters of the Sea of Okhotsk, the crew of the Borei-A-class SSBN К-553 “Generalissimus Suvorov” conducted a test launch of the R-30 “Bulava” SLBM at the Chizha test range in the Arkhangelsk Region.
🎥MoD RF(Oct 27-28)
tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/2826018…
Asuw retweeted
僕も名前を連ねました。慎重にならねばならないことはそれとして、声はあげねばならないと思っています。
駐日ロシア大使館にも送付しました。ご賛同いただける方はシェア、拡散をいただけるとありがたいです。
note.com/good_racoon2939/n/n…
Asuw retweeted
Hi there. Dima Treschanin of Mediazona here.
1. We don’t consider our 2022–2023 data to be “broadly complete.” We do have non-public data that would add several thousand more people, including about a thousand from Wagner PMC alone. But our methodology is fairly conservative, and we don’t want to change it midstream.
2. According to our data so far, 2025 has been the deadliest year of the war. Although we have identified more than 100,000 people killed with dates of death in 2024, we know for certain that losses in 2025 were significantly higher. Collecting that data will take considerable time, though; it’s simply an enormous amount of work.
3. Thanks to non-public sources, we can see how long it takes the state to register deaths. For example, we’re currently working through a list in which most of the people were likely killed in the summer or early fall of 2025. Today we learned the dates of death for nine of them, and roughly the same number last week. To be clear: these people died last summer. Their obituaries, if they appear at all, will be published some time from now.
4. As for 2026, the situation is even worse: even government agencies (outside the MoD) don’t know how many people have been killed this year. And let’s be real, the MoD itself may not have the full picture either.
5. The more “static” the front line, the harder it is to recover bodies. The harder it is to recover bodies, the larger the share of soldiers listed as missing in action, and the longer and more difficult the identification process becomes. This also leads to more errors in which living people are declared dead; such cases are very rare, but they do happen.
6. Barring any major changes at the front, we expect that for the rest of this year and most of next, the new data we add will mainly concern 2025.
7. For this reason, we can’t say whether 2026 will prove deadlier than 2025. But there is no reason to believe the situation has improved in any way for the Russian army: broadly, the same tactics and strategy are being used as in 2025. That said, any claim of rising losses requires evidence, and we don’t have that evidence yet.
Asuw retweeted
I disagree with this analysis, which contradicts me, so I think it’s necessary to come back to it. The author opens with “all evidence available point to the opposite”, yet he doesn’t cite a single piece of evidence.
🔶Saying that the drop in Russian armored vehicle losses proves Russia is losing fewer men is not only wrong, it’s actually a lie. First, armor has been sidelined since early 2024, which explains the drop. Second, Mediazona’s data (which is nearly complete up to early 2024) shows that losses are lower during periods of mechanized assaults (autumn 2023) than during periods of limited armor use (summer 2024).
Moreover, the author deliberately leaves out that while far fewer armored vehicles are being destroyed (because they’re used less), strikes on unarmored vehicles have exploded. We’re talking about 3,000 to 4,000 vehicles hit per week. These vehicles are barely counted, and they are struck daily 10, 20, 30 or even 50 km from the front. The human losses from these strikes are fairly high, since the vehicles are unprotected and can’t withstand drone attacks. To see this, you’d need to do a minimum of research and actually watch the videos. Strikes on unarmored vehicles also happen very far from the front: mid-range strikes alone have hit more than 2,000 confirmed vehicles since the start of the year, often more than 50 km from the front.
The author will probably bring out his usual line that these strikes have no impact and that vehicles can easily be replaced by buying them on the famous big used-car market in Central Asia. That’s one more thing he deliberately leaves out: the cost of the vehicles hit, the goods, ammunition and soldiers that never reach the front, the wounded and killed in these strikes (judging by the videos, this happens very regularly), and the knock-on effect on Russian logistics, which is far from negligible.
🔶Claiming that Mediazona proves there are fewer losses is also wrong. Mediazona takes time to update its list of losses and holds back part of its data, so as not to reveal weaknesses in the Russian government that would push it to shut down the information channels being used. Mediazona’s data is broadly complete up to the end of 2023, and as we’ve seen, entries are still regularly being added for 2024, two years ago. The chart showing the year each entry was added makes it very clear how much longer it now takes to record losses. As for the claim that no OSINT data shows any change in losses: well, that’s easy to say when you don’t do any OSINT yourself, have no contacts on the ground, and therefore bring no additional data.
🔶The 2026 attrition ratio is not more favorable than 2025’s. That’s false, and there is no “more balanced attrition approach.” This ignores Ukraine’s advantage in drone strikes (the kill zone is deeper) and Russia’s manpower problems, which force it to concentrate the offensive on certain areas. The infiltration strategy itself proves that attrition is not under Russian control. Does Russia have the advantage in artillery? No. It fires more, but at shorter range and with less accuracy, against Ukrainians who move less and stay camouflaged in their positions. Losses from artillery are minimal. The Ukrainians fire less, but further and more accurately, against a larger number of Russian troops. The Russians do have the advantage in airstrikes, but losses are mainly caused by drones, not KABs.
🔶The next point is less problematic. The rest is mostly a change of subject: why bring up deep strikes (which I never disputed) when the topic was first and foremost the front? Fine, it does tie back to attrition, but in doing so the author quietly admits that Russia is failing on the front and is focusing on a deep-strike campaign in the hope of making Ukraine give in.
I struggle to understand the author’s obsession with everything that’s negative for Ukraine and positive for Russia. For a “military theorist”, it’s a shame not to cover the whole picture, especially since he always finds a rational explanation for the Russian plan (“no, actually, if Russia isn’t advancing, it’s because it chose an attrition strategy”. Very funny 😊).
The “Russian losses increased” narrative is a fabrication, since all evidence available point to the opposite. Vehicle losses have decreased significantly compared to 2025, with armor down by a factor of 5 in average. (source: Oryx)
Mediazona’s in-year 2026 personnel-loss count remains 50% below 2025, without a valid explanation. The claim that bodies are harder to retrieve is insufficient: the battlefield and grey zone remain as dangerous as in 2025. Russian courts process MIA-to-KIA cases at high rates, and a body is not required to file for procedure. There has also been no specific additional documented enforcement of obituaries concealment which could explain such a sharp decrease.
Regardless, there are absolutely no OSINT data available supporting claims of increased total Russian (or Ukrainian) casualties in 2026. For all we know, it could be inferior, equivalent, higher...
The 2026 attrition ratio is more favorable for Russia than in 2025. Progress has slowed but stays within 2024 ranges once the AFU Kursk advances are factored in.
2025 was peculiar: the Kursk pocket collapse and rout destabilized Ukrainian forces and enabled rapid Russian advances front wide for 6 months.
All signs indicate that 2026 reflects a more balanced attrition approach after the extremely costly 2024 and the front-wide pressure of 2025 that leveraged the post-Kursk situation, but at high cost.
Another myth is: “if attrition worked Russian advances should accelerate”. In attrition warfare theories, the principle is to cause collapse of the adversary to enable decisive gains; not that advances will gradually increase in a linear way, which is subject to both side’s respective effort at a given time. For instance, the weaker side could expend massive resources in a surge attempt, stabilising in apparence the front but collapsing 6 months later.
In 2025, Ukrainian forces suffered a sector collapse in the Sudja pocket, which rendered an entire part of the army combat ineffective. Hence, advances ensued.
Nevertheless, Ukraine has accelerated mobilization (aggressively) and alternative means to recover, and is nowhere near a collapse of its ground military forces for the time being. Though, with a mobilization ratio currently standing at around 18-20% of the remaining military aged male population, it may be nearing sensitive levels.
The point is to separate military objectives: conquest of the 4 oblasts against which Moscow can measure military success, and political objectives: demilitarisation and neutrality of Ukraine, central to the strategic settlement Moscow continues to seek. (Ideally enforced by a favorable regime change)
This matters because to achieve its strategic political goal, Russia needs to continue investing in its expensive ballistic and drone programs to collapse the economy at the rear, and make rational choices for expenditures. Losing 4,000 armor a year is not an option anymore.
The ground offensive’s primary goal is therefore not military conquest but applying pressure on the entire Ukrainian economic and social apparatus, to support the achievement of the political ambition. Seizing Donbas is a secondary and corollary territorial objective, because the political goal naturally secures the territorial one.
Understanding this principle is the basis of analysing this war correctly.
Moscow’s objectives in this conflict have not changed, but the strategy adopted has been evolving regularly based on various factors, including setbacks. Kyiv has also been adapting continuously to prevent its success. In 2026, the military situation has somehow improved for Ukraine, but the social and economic ones deteriorated at an accelerated pace.
There is however no way to tell whether the Kremlin’s plan will ultimately succeed, even partially.
See an earlier analysis in reply to understand attrition warfare performance measurement methods.
#UkraineRussiaWar #Strategy #Attrition
