The election results in Serbia matter so much because they raise hopes that Russia’s influence in the Western Balkans could weaken. Serbia remains the main centre of Russian influence in the region. Through Belgrade’s ties with Serb communities, Moscow also influences neighbouring countries. Serbia supports parties and organisations in Republika Srpska, within Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in Montenegro and Kosovo. Churches, cultural organisations and media outlets bring them together around the idea of a “Serbian world”. Moscow had ties with the leadership of Serbia’s intelligence services. In July 2023, the United States imposed sanctions on Aleksandar Vulin, then head of Serbia’s BIA intelligence agency. The US Treasury accused him of promoting Russian influence, taking part in drug trafficking and facilitating illegal arms shipments. Local media help spread Russian propaganda. RT Balkan and Sputnik produce material that other outlets then republish. This brings justifications for the war against Ukraine and messages undermining trust in the EU and NATO to local audiences. Moscow also spreads its influence through the church. The Moscow Patriarchate works with the Serbian Orthodox Church, which operates in several countries in the region. The Serbian Church has its own national and political goals and ties with local parties. Russia’s Night Wolves and similar organisations recruit supporters for Moscow. They work through civic associations and informal groups. The ties between their members survive changes of government. Opaque business dealings help Russian organisations evade sanctions and maintain business ties. Corruption and weak financial oversight allow these schemes to operate locally. Serbia has been used to prepare provocations in other countries. Investigations into provocations in Western Europe and preparations for unrest in Moldova describe how people were recruited, trained and paid in Serbia to carry out these tasks. In September 2025, police detained two people suspected of organising such training near Loznica. According to Serbia’s Interior Ministry, between 150 and 170 Moldovan and Romanian citizens were trained there to put up violent resistance to Moldovan police during possible unrest on election day. People were paid monthly for taking part in provocations. In September 2025, Moldovan prosecutors reported on a network run by an officer from Russia’s military intelligence agency, the GRU. According to the prosecutors, a group leader received $500 a month, assistants $400 each and members $300 each. They had to provide photos and videos of their actions. Serbia’s dependence on Russian energy gives Moscow a way to put pressure on the country. Serbia buys Russian gas, and Russian companies own a stake in the oil company NIS. That means relations with the Kremlin affect prices and the reliability of supplies. Hungary’s MOL is in talks to buy the Russian stake in NIS. Permission to continue these talks has been extended until 30 October. Russia’s influence in Serbia could weaken following Vučić’s defeat. However, The Student List does not support sanctions against Russia and considers Kosovo part of Serbia. This leaves Moscow room to reach agreements with the new leadership. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moscow supports politicians who block the work of state institutions. Milorad Dodik and his SNSD party remain its main partners. The 4 October elections confirmed their influence. After being removed from public office, Dodik retained influence through Željka Cvijanović and other allies. Russia’s support helps them hold up reforms and maintain tensions over the country’s future. In Montenegro, Moscow uses disputes over Serb identity, language and the church to deepen divisions in society. Influential figures include Andrija Mandić of New Serb Democracy and Milan Knežević, leader of the DNP. Their ties with Belgrade and the church help Moscow influence the country’s politics. In January 2026, Knežević’s party stopped supporting Milojko Spajić’s government. These political forces can hold up decisions needed to join the EU. The conflict over Kosovo helps Moscow maintain its influence over Belgrade. Serb parties and organisations in Kosovo, including the Serb List, have ties with the Serbian authorities. An agreement between Belgrade and Pristina could reduce Serbia’s dependence on Russia. For now, neither side seems ready to take that step. Propaganda about Kosovo fuels fear and mistrust between communities. PolitNavigator, Pravda/Portal Kombat, Telegram channels and local websites tell their audiences that Kosovo’s authorities cannot govern the country, that Serbs are constantly in danger and that another crisis is inevitable. In North Macedonia, pro-Russian parties struggle to influence government decisions. They include Dimitar Apasiev’s Levica, Janko Bačev’s United Macedonia and Ivan Stoiljković’s Democratic Party of Serbs. Coalition partners that support the EU and NATO hold back decisions that would benefit Moscow. Delays in North Macedonia’s EU accession help Russian propaganda. The Kremlin exploits people’s frustration with Europe by spreading claims that the country is being humiliated, its language is under threat and others are dictating its choices. In Albania, Russian propaganda spreads through local websites. They republish material from the Russian embassy, Russian state media and the Albanian-language Pravda. In the rush for page views, newsrooms fail to check material properly and help spread the Kremlin’s version of events. Weak checks on company ownership and poor enforcement of sanctions leave Albania vulnerable to Russian business influence. BIRN investigators found that Strabag, in which Deripaska held a stake through Rasperia, received public contracts between 2019 and 2022. His rights as a shareholder were later frozen. Moscow gains influence where conflicts persist: they give it partners and reasons to intervene. Its influence weakens when states find common ground, agree on security and the rights of communities, and stick to those agreements.