kpm.das

The drone that kills an infantry section is often not the one that strikes it. It is the one that found it first. That is the starting point of Part 1 of my new three-part series, The Section and the Drone. Part 1 looks at the threat the Indian section faces, from Operation Sindoor to the find-fix-strike chain, and where we stand: fast progress on offensive drones, with Ashni platoons in every battalion, and far less clarity on defence at section level. Coming next: • Part 2: Deny first, shoot last. The layers of defence, in the order that matters. • Part 3: Organic or shared? Who should own what, and what Indian trials must prove. brignpsingh.substack.com/p/t…

The bane of AirPower is the demand for it.

In today’s IE. Some thoughts on the perennial issue of theatre commands.

Again, little understanding, maximum volume. Firstly, the point has been sensationalized. AFAIK, a model for theaterisation has been signed on. If IAF is withdrawing from it, I'm fairly certain it would not be through a CAS interview to the media. But why let facts get in the way of a good ol sneer? Next, there can be no such thing as 'forcing it down'. Force what? How do you know that is the divine truth? But what is needed is surely, greater political engagement on a sustained basis (not episodic) with the armed forces on the issue. A sustained engagement will build understanding of military capabilities in minds of the leadership, and of national goals and aspirations in the minds of the military leadership. It would yield the questions to be answered, as well as options for the answers. Above all, it would yield an informed leadership that can take a call on the best option from a position of informed strength, without necessary Chaperoning by the bureaucracy which itself has little expertise.

The military cudnt agree on a "model" in 35 yrs (since Kargil Committee). Scintillating.. GOI left it to the collective wisdom of the brass, when experience frm US/UK show politicians need to force the model thru, veto-ing the brass if needed...

I think there is a misunderstanding in this argument. The issue is not where aircraft are based, but who commands them, who can shift them between theatres, and who decides the priorities of the larger war. There is an interesting historical peculiarity here which most tend to gloss over. Until Independence, India had a single Commander-in-Chief over all three Services. In 1947, this arrangement gave way to three separate Service heads, each responsible for his own force, with their Commander-in-Chief designations subsequently standardised. In 1955, the Government removed the Commander-in-Chief designation, but Nehru explicitly stated that their authority, including operational authority, would remain unchanged. Over time, the Services developed subordinate formations, which today total 17 Commands. But these are not 17 independent command systems in the traditional sense. They are subordinate headquarters within three Service-wide command structures. Therefore, theatreisation is not quite the often-repeated reduction from 17 Commands to three. At the level of command authority, it is a reorganisation of three nationwide, Service-specific command structures into three geographically organised, joint theatre structures. Consider what this means for air power. Today, Air HQ can shift effort between its Commands as the larger air situation demands. Under theatreisation, the same aircraft may be assigned to different theatre commanders, each with legitimate operational priorities. Who decides when one theatre must surrender aircraft to another? And who ensures that these decisions serve the larger air campaign rather than the immediate needs of individual theatres? These concerns have historical precedent. In 1971, India deliberately concentrated its principal military effort in the East. Even within the Western theatre, aircraft and missions were shifted between sectors as the fighting developed. Having 60 squadrons instead of 30 may ease the resource constraint, but it does not remove the command question. Someone must still decide where air power is most needed and have the authority to move it. Unless that responsibility is clearly transferred elsewhere, Air HQ will perforce have to retain an operational role beyond the proposed mandate of 'Raise, Train, Sustain'. Of course, an empowered joint staff under the CDS could make these decisions, with the CDS effectively functioning as a Commander-in-Chief. But that requires a clear redistribution of authority, not merely replacing Air HQ with HQ IDS. Indeed, when the CDS was created in 2019, the Government explicitly stated that the CDS would not exercise military command over the three Service Chiefs. This is where the Kargil Review Committee's observations become relevant. Its principal criticism was that the Service Chiefs had become operational commanders at the expense of their responsibilities as Chiefs of Staff. The weakness it identified lay in integrated military advice, planning and decision-making at the apex, rather than simply in the absence of theatre commands. The higher-command question and theatreisation are two distinct reforms, yet they have increasingly come to be treated as one. One concerns how forces are commanded within a theatre. The other concerns who exercises military authority above the theatres and reconciles competing operational priorities. I explored the historical evolution of India's command structure, and particularly the distinction between theatreisation and higher defence reform, in some detail here: iafhistory.in/2026/08/22/the…

Interesting- France and Germany offer to build subs for Argentina, which will almost certainly use them against the UK in a future conflict as they did in 1982…but, but, but…let’s look what happened in 1982: France imposed an immediate weapons embargo on Argentina, cutting off spares and new hardware… France provided technical and radar vulnerability data on its Exocet anti-ship missiles, helping the Royal Navy develop effective countermeasures. In other words- the French helped both sides in the conflict. Thats how this dirty business works. No amount of ToT or sovereign guarantees can protect the interests of a nation that relies on imported weapons to defend itself. We should learn fm this.

A great session. Perspicacious