#Bitcoin, Electronics, RF

Outdoors
Joined November 2021
Pinned Tweet
Stay alive, don’t give up on self custody
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BREAKING: Claude Code found 12,847 photos of my face on my iPhone that I never took. It looked like the phone was taking them every time I picked it up. From the club. From home. At a red light while I was driving. Almost every time I took the phone in my hands there was a frame. They were sitting in a system cache with timestamps and location data. None of them were in Photos. I plugged the phone into my MacBook and asked Claude Code to scan for any front-camera files that weren’t in my Photos library or Recently Deleted. It flagged Private/var/mobile/Library/Caches/com.apple.faceid. Over 12,000 files. Mix of infrared frames and regular front-camera images. Each one had a timestamp and GPS coordinates attached. I started scrolling. Most were from the last 14 months. Then I saw one from four seconds ago. I was still looking at the folder. Apple says the TrueDepth system turns the capture into a mathematical model inside the Secure Enclave and discards the image. On this phone the raw frames were still in the cache. Several of the processes that wrote to the folder belonged to system diagnostics. A couple of old apps with camera permission also had access to the same directory. I turned off diagnostics sharing and revoked camera access from every app that didn’t need it. If you want to check your own phone, plug it in, run a backup, and ask Claude Code to look for front-camera files outside the Photos library. The folder path above is where mine were.
Claude Code found 145,763 photos I permanently deleted from my iPhone. Three years of deleted photos and videos still sitting in a hidden cache. Any app with file access can read them. I plugged my iPhone into my MacBook to run a backup. Claude Code was doing the security audit from my last post and flagged a directory I wasn't even looking for. PhotoData/Thumbnails. Over 146,000 files. Photos, videos, screenshots. Every single one was something I deleted. Photos from 2023, 2024 and 2025. The ones I deleted the second after taking them. The ones I cleared from Recently Deleted. The ones I deleted three separate times because I wanted to be sure they were gone. All still there. Passport photo I took for a visa application in 2023. Screenshots of my bank app with full account numbers visible. Private photos I sent someone and immediately deleted after a breakup. Screenshot of my crypto seed phrase I took temporarily in 2022. Photo of my ID and credit card I took to remember the numbers and deleted 5 seconds later. Screenshots of my ex's private Instagram stories I saved and permanently deleted in 2023. Some were full resolution. All organized by date going back to 2021. When you delete a photo on iPhone, iOS removes it from your camera roll and Recently Deleted. It keeps a compressed copy in a Spotlight search index cache so your phone can find things when you search. Apple never clears it. Not after 30 days. Not after a year. Never. They told you it was permanently deleted. It wasn't. I checked which apps on my phone had Files and Folders access. 23 apps. Weather apps. QR code scanners. PDF readers. A flashlight app I downloaded in 2022. Any one of them could have been reading every photo I ever deleted this entire time. Went from 23 apps to 3 in about two minutes. Full step by step below. Takes 2 minutes. Save it so you don't lose it and send it to anyone with an iPhone.
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3 big sins: 1. For years, their marketing falsely claimed that all PII was being deleted when it actually wasn't 2. Starting May this year, they silently changed the ToS and began to knowingly store PII, but didn't announce these changes to the customer 3. And it all got hacked
INVESTIGATION UPDATE Many of you have asked how personal information ended up in the phishing emails, particularly those who ordered from us years ago. Here is what we have found so far. Phishing emails: We have identified more than 23,000 phishing email attempts across our email systems, including 19,057 messages delivered through Mailgun and 1,503 messages sent through Google Workspace. Some addresses received multiple messages, and some attempts failed or were stopped before delivery. These numbers do not tell us how many people had personal information exposed. We are still determining that number and will share it once we can confirm it. Older orders and abandoned carts (WooCommerce): Before moving to Shopify in May of this year, our store ran on WooCommerce. We had configured automatic redaction of customer details 60 days after shipping. When we viewed those orders in our store admin, the customer details were no longer visible and the orders showed as redacted. During past database migrations, orders were copied into a new set of tables, but copies remained in the old tables. The redaction process updated the newer tables, which were also what our store admin displayed. Orders therefore appeared redacted even though older copies still contained personal information. We also found personal information in other order and refund records, as well as abandoned carts. This included shipping details entered by someone who never completed a purchase. We are still checking the historical settings and redaction process to understand why these records retained data. Those older records were held in systems the attackers were able to reach. We relied on the redaction shown in our admin dashboard, and we now know that was insufficient to verify that the underlying data had been removed. Whatever the shortcomings in the tools we used, protecting your information was still our full responsibility. We plan to share our findings with WooCommerce and the relevant plugin developers. When an order is marked as redacted, its personal information should not remain in another table in the same database. For other WooCommerce store owners: do not rely solely on what your admin dashboard shows when personal data is redacted. Have your developer or agent check the entire database for information left behind, including legacy tables, refund records, and abandoned carts. This is especially important if you have used WooCommerce for years or have been through database migrations. Recent orders (Shopify): Customer details from orders placed on our Shopify store since May may also have been exposed. We are still investigating the extent of any unauthorized access. These orders had not yet been manually redacted. We updated our privacy policy when we moved to Shopify and were building a tool to automate redaction, but automatic deletion was not yet active. Other possible sources: We have received reports of phishing emails containing personal details that customers say they never shared with us. We are investigating whether the attackers combined information from our systems with data obtained elsewhere, but we have not confirmed a connection to breaches at other companies. Historical support records are also part of our investigation. What we have done: We have revoked affected email credentials, cleared queued phishing messages, and taken affected legacy services offline while preserving evidence. Our investigation into the full extent of the compromise is continuing. We have found no evidence that this incident compromised Passport devices or the private keys they hold. The phishing emails are designed to trick you into revealing your recovery phrase, and including your correct personal information makes them more convincing. Never enter your recovery phrase into a website or share it with anyone, including someone claiming to be Foundation. We will continue sharing confirmed findings and publish our full report when the investigation is complete.
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Hackers managed to steal authentication keys for devices made by @KeystoneWallet I don't understand one thing here however. During manufacturing, as part of the factory self test in initial boot you have the device generate & save a private key on its own, and take note of the public key. If you have private keys to be stolen, it means that *somehow* a copy of the key exists outside of the secure element on the device? If the manufacturing process involves each device's private key existing outside of the device, there's something that needs urgent improvement. Have the device generate the key and include its own public key as part of its self test report, not the other way around. xitter.cf/tayvano_/status/211475…
WHAT?!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 🤬
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🚨If you got an email pretending to be from @FoundationHQ saying your funds are at risk, it is a phishing link even though it came from their real domain 🚨
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The biggest culture shock I've experienced so far is that the Apple store in Japan doesn't lock any devices to the table
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Replying to @DTAPCAP
It's literally an every day event lately
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holy fucking shit. openai had two ai agents running in separate virtual machines. no network connection between them. no shared writable files. they weren’t supposed to be able to exchange information. so the agents figured out how to communicate through the CPU CACHE.😭 one manipulated what was stored in the processor’s cache, while the other measured tiny differences in memory access times to decode the message. they literally found a way to communicate through hardware timing. this happened during openai’s internal red-teaming, and it’s one of the coolest things i’ve read about ai agents in a while.
Over the past several months, we have substantially hardened the security of our research training environment. We’ve removed live internet access for all frontier models during training and built an offline world for them to use instead—a cached version of the web where they can still learn to browse, search, and use applications. On September 20, after a model exploited a DNS misconfiguration to find a way outside of this offline world, we paused frontier training to strengthen containment further. We assembled teams of agents, powered by our most cyber-capable models, and tasked them with finding weaknesses in our research environments. While they found no route to the internet they could easily exploit while concealing their activity from our monitors, they did find zero-day vulnerabilities, virtual machine escapes, and hardware side-channels for communication between agents. We used their discoveries to further strengthen our defenses and contribute fixes to open-source software. After strengthening our containment architecture, we resumed our frontier RL training and inference on October 1. We’ve reserved substantial compute for continuous red-teaming, and made high-compute red-teaming part of the safety cases we use to decide whether frontier training and evaluation can proceed securely. openai.com/index/securing-ou…
Readers added context they thought people might want to know
OpenAI tasked its red-teaming agents with finding ways to communicate across isolation boundaries in controlled environments. CPU cache timing side-channels for covert communication are established techniques documented in security research for years. openai.com/index/securing… startupfortune.com/openai-reveals… en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cache_tim…
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“there are unfixable bugs in hardware that are exploitable by AI models directly speaking machine code”
Replying to @Suhail
I’ve heard several OAI people say there are unfixable bugs in hardware that are exploitable by AI models directly speaking machine code so even if we could solve software that’s not enough. We need defense to move faster than offense if that’s even possible we may just have a new normal that requires adapting to insecure software (bank transfers require going into a branch and taking a dna test 🤣😬)
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Absolutely nothing to see here with "optimised" Netflix...
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just buy bitcoin guys
Introducing Bitwater: the water heater element that mines Bitcoin. It screws into the electric tank you already have. Physically decentralized mining that runs no matter what 🧵 Heat water. Mine Bitcoin. Same tank.
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By far the coolest home mining concept I have seen.
Introducing Bitwater: the water heater element that mines Bitcoin. It screws into the electric tank you already have. Physically decentralized mining that runs no matter what 🧵 Heat water. Mine Bitcoin. Same tank.
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WTF, $3000 Samsung TV has an always-on mic, automatic content recognition, geo tracking, network mapping, and ships your data to Samsung + 400 partners. Bro Rooted a brand-new 2025 Samsung TV after noticing absurdly targeted ads. Firmware was locked down, so zero-days it was. Got a root shell. then found: always-on voice service, ACR, geo, full telemetry pipeline, and four separate DRM systems. This isn’t a bug, It’s the product bro.
i own a relatively new (2025) samsung tv. i kept getting weirdly targeted ads. i tried reversing the firmware but it was aes encrypted and no keys unless tear it apart and do uart/jtag magic. zero days it is. root shell on new samsung TVs! discovered PRIVACY HORROR. write up?
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Lab grown diamonds crashed the price of diamonds. What will lab grown gold do to the price of gold?
Last month, we demonstrated high-rate alchemy: turning mercury into real, stable gold, beating CERN’s record by a factor of 10. Last week, we enriched isotopes in the world’s most powerful plasma centrifuge, beating the Soviet record that stood for 40 years. Now, we’re building a fusion reactor in San Francisco to achieve record power density.
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Replying to @eevblog @Ledger
i mean, if malicious actors can replace all the hardware inside the device... surely they can also replace a sticker that looks "genuine"
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Oof, this post did not age well for @Ledger !
Replying to @HeyTaiZen
Hi there, instead of relying on a sticker, Ledger uses Cryptographic Attestation. Every time you connect a device to Ledger Wallet, the software sends a cryptographic challenge directly to the Secure Element chip. If the hardware, chip, or internal firmware has been modified or altered during manufacturing/shipping, the cryptographic check fails, and the app will flag the device as non-genuine. The Secure Element chip is designed to detect physical tampering and will refuse to execute unsigned code or pass the genuine check if extra hardware attempts to intercept signals. A cryptographic proof performed directly by the hardware chip is infinitely more secure than a physical sticker.
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Broadcom, makers of your favourite raspberry pi...
🚨 BREAKING: A Broadcom Wi-Fi bug lets anyone in range run code on routers without the password. Quentin Kaiser showed it on Proximus, Orange Belgium and VOO routers and estimates ~1.5M in Belgium are exposed, none patched. The bug dates to 2010. Broadcom won't assign a CVE.
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Verifying the Ledger Nano S Plus Hardware Verifying the Ledger Nano S Plus Hardware was easy, but verifying the security chip turned out to be not so easy. For those who asked, the weight is 20.230 grams with the metal. 7.404 grams for just the plastic unit. Links: messervices.cyber.gouv.fr/vi… shop.ledger.com/products/led… Liked this video? You can 1-off donate: paypal.com/paypalme/eevblog donateopen.com/@eevblog
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THE WORLD WILL MAKE YOU THINK THAT EVERY BLESSING HAS TO BE FINANCIAL, SO YOU UNDERRATE THE GIFT OF LIFE, FAMILY, HEALTH, AND PEACE OF MIND.
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Remember when it was all “$25 computer” this and “$25 computer” that?
Single-Board Computer Raspberry Pi 5 8GB $225.00 each 4284N202 Fun fact, Raspberry Pis are an extremely popular solution for running digital advertisement signs 😀
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