Othman

I read Ismail H. Warsame’s article, “Grievance Is Not a Mandate”, and found its portrayal of Puntland’s position deeply unfair and rather dismissive. It downplays the fundamental problems that emerged with the federal arrangement back in 2012, during HSM’s first administration. Puntland’s letter was the culmination of a prolonged political and institutional conflict, not some sudden expression of “frustration” or “grievances” following the March 2024 constitutional amendments, nor merely a negotiating tactic aimed at the UN. Frankly, I find that framing deeply disrespectful to the innocent people of Puntland who have suffered the consequences of the FGS’s coercive tactics over the years. I know something of those consequences personally. One of my own relatives was devastated when she was unable to continue her education after secondary school. And what about the development projects that were obstructed or suspended, to name just a few examples? These are real people, lost opportunities and lasting consequences, not merely political grievances to be casually brushed aside. Perhaps it is time for a proper cost–benefit analysis. If the original investment was a poor one, that is hardly an argument for committing yet another generation to paying for it. In economics, we call that the sunk-cost fallacy. In politics, apparently, we call it preserving national unity. Our generation is still paying the price for decisions made by previous generations, and I see no reason why we should continue sacrificing our future to sustain a political arrangement that has repeatedly failed to deliver. The old one-size-fits-all mentality has had its day. And historical sacrifices, however significant, are not a permanent mandate to decide the future of generations yet to come. The founders made their choices in 1998. Our generation has the right to make its own. Curiously, the author insists that secession is not the majority view in Puntland, while simultaneously criticising Deni for making claims about public sentiment without a referendum or polling. Where, then, is the evidence for his own assertion? Surely, the same democratic standard must apply to both sides. Nor should anyone assume that the people of Puntland will simply accept another political arrangement negotiated over their heads. Every society should have a say in determining the political system best suited to its circumstances and aspirations. As for confederation, I find the renewed enthusiasm rather predictable. Some of us @FarahJuxa proposed precisely that arrangement years ago, only to be dismissed or accused of advocating secession. nitter.gq/farahjuxa/status/19232… nitter.gq/dahirseed/status/19839… Even Adeer @alihwarsame was critical of the proposal, if I recall correctly. Confederation might have been a reasonable compromise years ago. Today, it increasingly resembles a last-minute attempt to preserve a political structure whose foundations have already given way. And no, Puntland does not need to actively pursue separation for the existing arrangement to collapse. It seems perfectly capable of achieving that through its own failures and political miscalculations. One must admire the consistency, if nothing else. Puntland has no moral or legal obligation to rescue a failing political arrangement. Ultimately, our first responsibility is to the people of Puntland, their rights, their interests and the future they choose for themselves. Grievance is not a mandate. Neither is history. Puntland First. Its people. Its future. Its right to decide.

Is Washington Rethinking Its Strategy in South-Central Somalia? The fact that the United States 🇺🇸 describes al-Shabaab as a “tribal-based Islamist insurgency” in its May 2026 Counterterrorism Strategy is far more significant than many seem to realise. What makes this interesting is not merely the choice of words, but what it may signal about how Washington now views the conflict in South-Central Somalia. From being viewed primarily through the lens of international terrorism and al-Qaeda’s global network to being increasingly understood as a locally rooted, clan-based Islamist insurgency. The Bigger Strategic Picture This is where several developments deserve closer examination. Look at the evolution of US policy towards Mogadishu. Look at the growing interest in Puntland, Jubaland and Somaliland. Examine AFRICOM’s airstrikes, their geographical concentration, and how military cooperation has evolved. Then add Washington’s opposition to further funding for AUSSOM. And above all, the recurring American frustration with a war in which towns are recaptured from al-Shabaab at enormous cost, only to be lost again once military forces withdraw. How many times must the same town be liberated? How many times must the same offensive be financed? And for how many more years can a military stalemate be presented as a transition towards stability? After nearly 20 years of international military presence, billions of dollars in aid, and repeated offensives against al-Shabaab, it is a question that deserves to be asked. Is the United States beginning to reconsider not only its strategy against al-Shabaab, but its entire security policy approach towards South-Central Somalia? Source: whitehouse.gov/wp-content/up…

The other day I watched Hassan Sheikh at the 🇺🇳 UN. The hall was almost empty, but there he was talking about Somalia moving forward, security improving and everything heading in the right direction. I kept listening and thinking… what Somalia is he talking about? Then I looked at him standing there at the podium and, for some reason, I thought of the violinists on the Titanic. You know the scene. The ship is sinking. Water is pouring in. People are panicking. But the violinists keep playing. I couldn’t get that image out of my head. The water keeps rising. The ship keeps sinking. And there’s Hassan at the podium, still playing the violin as if everything is going perfectly according to plan.