Robbert

𝐂𝐡𝐢𝐧𝐚’𝐬 𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐭𝐞-𝐥𝐞𝐝 𝐞𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐨𝐦𝐲 𝐢𝐬 𝐜𝐞𝐫𝐭𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐥𝐲 𝐚 𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐛𝐥𝐞𝐦. 𝐁𝐮𝐭 𝐰𝐡𝐚𝐭 𝐚𝐛𝐨𝐮𝐭 𝐄𝐮𝐫𝐨𝐩𝐞𝐚𝐧 𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐥𝐢𝐜𝐢𝐭𝐲 𝐢𝐧 𝐢𝐭𝐬 𝐫𝐢𝐬𝐞? I finally had some time to read @thorstenbenner's essay “The Coming Clash Between China and Europe. Why a Trade War Can’t Be Avoided” in Foreign Affairs [1]. I was particularly interested how he describes how Europe got into this mess in the first place. A central argument is that “(a) decade ago, European policy toward China was defined by complacency.” In the section titled "While Europe slept," Benner traces a gradual awakening — from complacency to hardened resolve — that reads a bit too smoothly. Based on my scholarship this perspective is only covering half of the problem. What is missing from the equation is European complicity. Many European actors weren't just passive in the process of China engagement — they actively enabled China's state-led economy. The Hungarian Economist Janos Kornai made a similar point in one of his last public interventions, a 2019 Financial Times op-ed, where he asked whether western intellectuals bore responsibility for what he called this "nightmare," and argued that the West had actively contributed to these changes [2]. What is missing from Benner’s piece is how interest groups in Germany and elsewhere in Europe have lobbied against any attempt to re-adjust our China policy. Despite talk of China as a systemic rival, why hasn't de-risking progressed, why does German business continue to deepen its China exposure, and why can't Merz and Macron agree on protective measures? Benner's analysis also lacks a critique of Germany's corporatist political economy and how it has prevented a shift on China policy. Why doesn't he name the laggards: the Big Four VW, BMW, Mercedes-Benz, and BASF? The China lobby, the powerful Asia-Pacific Committee of German Business? Or Germany's Economics Minister, who appears to be blocking a more assertive German (and thereby European) China policy? In recent years it has become far more mainstream to critique China's state-led economy. But criticising western enablers is much more uncomfortable, as it requires us to speak truth to power at home. The challenge is actually two-fold: we have to pose what I call the "doppelte Machtfrage" – who holds power and uses it to what extent – both at home and abroad. That means criticising the powerful in Berlin, Brussels, and Beijing. If we want a more realistic and effective European China policy, we have to accept such frictions in the public debate. Kornai engaged in self-criticism, pointing out how his own advice to the CCP leadership contributed to the ‘monstrous’ turn of China’s economic development. Perhaps we should all become a bit more like Kornai. China's imbalanced economy did not develop in isolation, and the West bears a great deal of responsibility. That won't make solutions easier. But it addresses the root causes of our current predicament.