Israel’s elections could influence events far beyond the Middle East. Voting is underway, and the latest polls put the new Yashar party, led by Gadi Eisenkot, in the lead. But finishing first does not guarantee taking power. Everything will depend on who can reach an agreement with whom and form a government. Even a change of prime minister, however, offers little reason to expect a rapid shift towards peace in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Eisenkot and Netanyahu both support tough security policies and oppose an independent Palestinian state. They differ significantly on other issues: judicial independence, military conscription for the ultra-Orthodox, and settlements in Palestinian territories. Eisenkot may be more open to certain compromises, but he remains willing to use force. The prospects for peace depend in part on what Israeli politicians are prepared to call a victory. For some, weakening their adversaries and securing reliable security guarantees might be enough. For religious nationalists, territorial expansion is a goal in itself. They may therefore see abandoning annexation as a defeat, even if attacks cease. Netanyahu has to accommodate such partners to remain in power. Reducing their influence could matter at least as much as replacing the prime minister. Better relations with the West could help Eisenkot both negotiate and wage war. He has already supported US–Israeli strikes on Iran and proposed a US-led regional security alliance. His government might find it easier to secure Western support for a limited military operation if it also curbed settler violence and agreed to negotiations over Gaza. Diplomatic flexibility would therefore not necessarily mean a less forceful military policy. The next 6–12 months are likely to bring renewed attempts to use force to extract concessions, followed by a return to negotiations. One possible scenario is another US–Israeli campaign against Iran. Trump may be hoping for a short operation after which he can declare victory, strike a deal, and bring down energy prices. Israeli leaders may seek to use American support while it remains available. CNN reports that military options have been drawn up, although no final decision has yet been made. Iran will find it difficult to make concessions as long as its leaders fear being overthrown. If Tehran believes that meeting the demands would leave it more vulnerable to attack, continued resistance will seem safer. A limited operation could escalate into a major war despite the participants’ initial intentions. The trigger could be heavy American casualties, the destruction of energy infrastructure, or strikes that Tehran interprets as the beginning of an attempt to eliminate its leadership. Iran could respond by attacking more countries and targets, seeking to make the war too costly for its adversaries. The parties would then become increasingly embroiled in an exchange of strikes. The war could intensify the very threats it was launched to eliminate. If conventional weapons and diplomacy fail to protect Iran from attack, advocates of acquiring nuclear weapons will gain another argument in their favour. Overthrowing the current leadership would not guarantee democracy either: military leaders could take its place, and the struggle for power could drag on for years. Even if a major war is avoided, without an agreement the region could remain trapped between strikes and fragile ceasefires for a long time. Under this scenario, the US would avoid large-scale intervention, Iran would reject its demands, and Israel would continue conducting individual military operations. A similar pattern is already evident in Gaza and Lebanon: the intensity of fighting has declined, but disputes over disarmament, territorial control, and troop withdrawal remain unresolved. An agreement between the US and Iran could offer both sides an acceptable way out of the confrontation. Tehran would agree to verifiable restrictions on its nuclear programme, an end to attacks, safe passage for shipping, and reduced military aid to groups that threaten its neighbours. In return, it would receive relief from the blockade and sanctions, alongside a commitment not to overthrow its leadership by military force as long as it complies with the agreement. Trump could present this as a diplomatic victory, while Iran would gain economic relief. Such an agreement would not rule out domestic political change in the country. Trump may put pressure on Netanyahu if continued warfare undermines American interests. Washington bears military and economic costs, while Israeli leaders may consider further strikes necessary. According to media reports, some of Trump’s advisers are already dissatisfied with Netanyahu’s policies. A Republican defeat in the congressional elections could strengthen the White House’s desire to end the confrontation, although it would not, on its own, determine its decisions. Iran’s neighbours seek to contain its influence but fear the consequences of its collapse. Further attacks on infrastructure, refugee flows, and prolonged instability would threaten their own security. Talks involving Saudi, Turkish, and Pakistani delegations in Tehran show that these countries are trying to shape events. Their interests nevertheless differ: the UAE may deepen military cooperation with Israel while opposing its policies towards the Palestinians. For a lasting peace, an agreement with Iran must be coupled with a settlement of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Reducing the threat of a major regional war will not, in itself, remove the causes of local conflicts. The shared goals should be a secure existence for Israel, a sovereign Palestine, and mutual commitments by states to refrain from aggression. To achieve this, Israel needs a government able to negotiate without depending on supporters of annexation. It would need to halt settlement expansion and settler violence, accept Palestinian statehood, and establish the terms for withdrawing troops. Eisenkot’s current platform does not include such changes. His coming to power could facilitate some negotiations, but a comprehensive settlement would require a broader reassessment of Israeli policy. A Palestinian state must have effective authority over its territory and take responsibility for security within it. The two-state model entails agreed borders, mutual recognition, and protection for both peoples from attack. This requires Palestinian authorities with public support, accountable institutions, and control over all armed forces. Hamas cannot retain a separate army, and Israel cannot maintain indefinite military control that reduces Palestinian sovereignty to a formality. Statehood, governance reforms, and the disarmament of Hamas are linked in the 2025 New York Declaration. Confidence in the agreements will depend on the US being willing to demand compliance from all parties. Washington could guarantee Israel’s protection while making part of its support conditional on adherence to the agreements. For Iran, fulfilling its commitments must bring real economic relief. The guarantees themselves must be secured in a way that allows them to withstand a change of US president. Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen will need political settlements of their own. In Lebanon, there is already a basis for strengthening the national army and withdrawing Israeli troops, although implementation remains difficult. Regional agreements involving Iran, Turkey, and Arab states are needed on non-aggression, safe passage for shipping, and the prevention of military clashes. The Gulf states could support these efforts by funding reconstruction and expanding trade. Peace will have powerful opponents, so it will need public support. For supporters of annexation, compromise would mean giving up territorial claims; for Iran’s security establishment, it would mean losing some regional influence. Hamas and Hezbollah leaders may see disarmament as a threat to their power and personal safety. Even weakened, they will retain the capacity to derail agreements. It will be easier to resist such efforts if people experience the practical benefits of peace: security, political rights, jobs, and the opportunity to rebuild their lives.