Senior Analyst, Iran and Oil @EurasiaGroup. Formerly @ISSYale. Author of "The Struggle for Iran" and "Petroleum and Progress in Iran." Views my own.
Joined October 2012
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New pinned tweet, as the links broke for the old one:
"Petroleum and Progress in #Iran: Oil, Development, and the Cold War." cambridge.org/us/academic/su…
"The Struggle for #Iran: Oil, Autocracy, and the Cold War, 1951-1954." uncpress.org/book/9781469671…
Another way of interpreting this is that oil flows have increased *because* prices are high.
Producers can make money with Brent at $100+, while shippers are willing to take the chance with freight rates at historic levels.
Question then becomes how long demand is sustained at this level, and where the trade-offs come on the consumer side.
There is a fascinating tidbit in this story that takes some of the bloom off the rose.
Oil is flowing through the Gulf at pre-war levels, largely because the potential profits have increased (i.e., energy prices are higher).
Traders and shipowners are willing to take the risk of an Iranian attack because if they can make it through the Strait unmolested, a bigger payday awaits. But that also means there is no downward pressure on prices, because while oil is flowing, the transport costs are so much higher.
In short, until risk premiums fall—and ships don't have to worry about being attacked—oil prices will likely remain high.
tbh prices are rising (at $117 currently, the highest level since April) not just because of Iranian attacks, but because of the mounting signs that the US and Israel are planning to re-escalate the conflict after the midterms.
There is little confidence in the market that the current high level of flows will be sustained once the shootings starts again in earnest.
Gregory Brew retweeted
We are. Except for election fever, the disruption in the Strait of Hormuz, and oil prices.
We examine with @becca_wasser @ZiadMDaoud via @TheTerminal blinks.bloomberg.com/news/st…
Trump believes that he can force Iran's capitulation. Netanyahu is advocating for another round of bombing that can cause collapse inside Iran and regime change. Trump appears to be leaning in that direction.
We truly are back to February. theatlantic.com/national-sec…
The last time the Brent front month was in the mid-$110s was in late April.
Much sharper backwardation in the curve, with short-term tightness expected but medium-to-long term equilibrium.
Everybody in the Spring thought this would be over soon. Nobody thinks that anymore.
Reporting and recent comments suggest that new US strikes will not aim to simply degrade Iran's capabilities or reduce their position in the strait (i.e. what the US attempted with strikes in July/August).
Rather, there is a body of opinion inside the admin that another round of strikes would "finish off" Iran, pushing it to the point where it will capitulate to US demands, agree to a deal that favored the US, allowing the war to end with US victory.
One can dispute the validity of this position. But it seems to be what is informing US thinking.
Trump, on the war with Iran:
We could end it very quickly...Do we want to finish it off or just want to let it wither?
Comes as reporting suggests he is considered new strikes on Iran after the midterm elections.
Brent front month is up 10% for the week and now exceeds $116, the highest point since late April.
Happy Friday!
Per Kpler, there is 300k bbls of Russian diesel currently bound for the US.
This is the first direct shipment of Russian diesel to the US since 2022.
Trump believes that he can force Iran's capitulation. Netanyahu is advocating for another round of bombing that can cause collapse inside Iran and regime change. Trump appears to be leaning in that direction.
We truly are back to February. theatlantic.com/national-sec…
Gregory Brew retweeted
COLUMN: Don't mistake Mideast oil rebound for normality
Crude oil prices remain near five-month highs despite a recent surge in Middle East crude exports above pre-war levels and intensifying Iranian attacks on tankers in the Strait of Hormuz. This suggests investors may already be bracing for another round of regional escalation.
The rebound in crude flows from the Gulf is striking. Middle East oil exports have averaged 17.3 million barrels per day (bpd) so far in October, up from 16.4 million bpd in September and above the 16.9 million bpd average in the two months before US-Israeli strikes on Iran began on February 28, according to Kpler data.
The sustained traffic is a clear sign that Gulf producers and tanker owners are willing to tolerate the risk of attack.
But higher flows should not be mistaken for a return to normality.
Read my full Reuters Open Interest column
reuters.com/commentary/reute…
"Briefly re-touching" is right.
At the moment, it looks like flows on 14-18 Oct spiked hard (thanks in part to a big day of loadings at Yanbu on 17 Oct), but slumped again right after.
All prelim data, we'll have a better sense of things next week, but the WSJ headline may have been a bit premature.
Gregory Brew retweeted
Refineries don’t set fuel prices. So who does?
Crude costs, tanker rates, refining and a global market all play a role. API’s @T_Mason_H breaks it down 💡
More trouble at Joliet is to blame--also, why it's dangerous to skip maintenance season and run refineries at 97% utilization for months on end.
Iranians were reportedly annoyed by these warnings, since to them it looks like blackmail--accept Trump's demands or he'll bomb you--and also because they suspect Trump will bomb them regardless of whether a deal is reached ahead of Nov 3 or not.
Once again: military pressure doesn't have a great track record as a means of compellence on Iran. Their instinct is to resist. And that's what they're going to do.
'Mediators are warning Iran to take the negotiations seriously, or Trump may lose interest and launch new strikes'
Senior Middle East Correspondent @Ariel_Oseran joins @Nicole_Zedeck on #MiddleEastNow
Read more here 👉 i24news.tv/en/news/middle-ea…
Data suggests that Iran's stock of oil on the water has been depleted.
FWIW on average 2026 will likely be a profitable year for Iran, given high prices and several periods (Mar-Apr, July) of very high loadings.
But earnings in 2027, absent an end to the US blockade, will be zero. wsj.com/world/middle-east/ir…
A fascinating interview with Rezaee from @DropSiteNews. He lays out Iran's position and strategy in clear language.
-The goal is not to survive to the end of Trump's term, but to restore deference by inflicting costs.
-Iran remains open to a deal based on the MOU from June, which was incorrectly implemented.
-Iran is ready for war and will retaliate--civilian infrastructure could be a target (though Rezaee is a bit more conditional here than in other recent interviews).
⚡️ EXCLUSIVE: Iran could expand its targets to include data centers, AI facilities and communications cables if the U.S. resumes attacks, Gen. Mohsen Rezaei, Iran’s top security official, told Drop Site News.
Rezaei, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and personal representative of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, spoke to Drop Site in an exclusive written interview.
“If the question is whether Iran still has the ability to continue missile and drone operations, the answer is yes,” Rezaei said.
“The United States has valuable assets in the region. In the event of war, cables, data centers and artificial intelligence facilities could also come within range. If the conflict begins again, we will have a broader plan.”
🔗 A short summary of the report is linked below. Read the full report from Jeremy Scahill, Ryan Grim and Peiman Salehi linked in the replies.
US officials cited here think that an intense, brief (as in, a few days) air campaign will push Iran into making concessions on its nuclear program.
These predictions have been made before. They have proven incorrect. Iran is broadly signaling it is ready for an attack, that it expects one, and will retaliate aggressively.
Trump has yet to make a decision. nytimes.com/2026/10/21/us/po…
